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Abstract 
This report analyses the proposed expansion of innovative financial instruments in the EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework for the 2014–20 period. It presents the economic rationale, 
governance principles and criteria that these instruments should follow and compares these 
with  proposals  from  the  European  Commission.  Based  on  this  assessment,  it  makes 
recommendations for the proposed instruments. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
he European Union’s objectives and aspirations have greatly increased in the last two 
decades, while the Union's budget has shrunk in real terms as a percentage of Gross 
National Income (GNI). The introduction of financial instruments that combine EU-
budget support  with  loans  from  the  EIB  Group  (the  European Investment  Bank  and  the 
European Investment Fund), as well as from other financial institutions, is seen as one way 
of expanding the reach and increasing the effectiveness of the EU budget. The financial and 
sovereign debt crisis has also increased the need for innovative financial solutions to the 
weakening credit market for public infrastructures, research and development (R&D) and 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While EU-level financial instruments cannot fill 
the vacuum created by the credit crunch and the sovereign debt crisis, they can offer specific 
support in terms of growth and job creation for areas with European added value and that 
are capable of providing significant long-term returns. Moreover, these instruments open up 
a new space for institutions and levels of power to collaborate, and facilitate the pooling of 
resources and development of common standards across the EU. These indirect benefits of 
well-devised mechanisms can create considerable efficiencies of scale.  
The  current  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF)  for  2007  to  2013  introduced  an 
unprecedented number (more than 20) of so-called ‘innovative financial instruments (InFIs)’. 
Although  only  1.3%  of  EU-budget  resources  were  allocated  to  these  instruments,  this 
relatively  small  amount  enables  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  Group  and  other 
lenders to multiply the original budget contribution by a factor of more than 30 in the forms 
of loans in certain instances. Positive evaluations of these instruments have encouraged the 
European Commission to propose expanding the size and scope of the existing instruments, 
to introduce ambitious new instruments, and to reform and consolidate the overall delivery 
architecture.  
Although  the  success  of  these  financial  instruments  has  greatly  raised  expectations,  it  is 
important to remember that InFIs are only suitable for projects with potentially profitable 
financial returns. They should not be seen as substitutes for grants, but rather as means of 
enhancing the scope of the EU budget. Greater discrimination is needed regarding projects 
that need grants and those that could be at least partially financed with loans. InFIs that 
combine grants – to reduce the overall cost and risk of projects – and loans help boost the 
credit  rating  of  projects  that  otherwise  would  not  have  seen  the  light  of  day.  Grant 
components attract financiers. 
InFIs can only be used for projects with significant European added value, where the internal 
rate of return (IRR) is either close to positive, or positive but not high enough to attract 
financiers because of market failures, long maturities or other barriers that can be reduced by 
using InFIs.  
While financial instruments are market-driven and their design requires a certain flexibility 
to cope with changing market needs, their genuine European added value must be ensured 
and they must be closely aligned with  EU policy objectives.  These financial instruments 
must also mobilise as much capital as possible towards the achievement of EU objectives, 
that is, they must have a high multiplier effect and European added value. 
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Governance structures will be designed for the debt and equity platforms in development, 
those  will  be  important  for  ensuring  efficient  InFIs.  The  degree  of  risk  of  both  financial 
instruments  and  grants  depends  on  the  implementation  framework,  which  includes  the 
project selection process and the governance structures decided within the equity and debt 
platforms. Instead of creating a restrictive regulatory framework about the type of support 
and beneficiary, it is the focus of the instruments, the policy objectives and the monitoring 
that need to be strengthened. 
The use of InFIs can be classified in three groups: Instruments for internal policies that are 
managed  by  the  European  Commission;  instruments  under  shared  management  that  are 
controlled by member states (Structural and Cohesion Funds); and financial instruments for 
external action. Although specific details of the structures for the period 2014-2020 are not 
known,  the  Commission  generally  proposes  restructuring  and  consolidating  InFIs  in  the 
2014–2020 period, expanding their scope and creating new instruments, including the Project 
Bonds Initiative (PBI). This restructuring will attempt to address the inefficiencies revealed 
by evaluations of the current instruments, including inconsistencies that result from having 
independently  developed  a  large  number  of  instruments,  thereby  causing  unnecessary 
differences between the instruments – as well as overlaps. 
A) Innovative financial instruments under central management 
In order to reach the Europe 2020 Strategy objectives, the EU has proposed to consolidate 
centrally controlled financial instruments into six instruments. These instruments include the 
Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) for research and innovation; equity and guarantees for 
innovative SMEs, microfinance, education and culture; and instruments for transport and 
energy.  
The new proposals strengthen the debt instruments using a portfolio approach that is based 
on the new risk-sharing model for the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF). The previous 
risk distribution between the EIB and the EU budget for internal policies was designed pari 
passu, meaning that the EU and the EIB shared the guarantee risks equally. For example, in 
the RSFF for research and innovation, the EIB and the Commission each cover 50% of the 
guarantee. In the future, however, the portfolio approach will have a first-loss mechanism 
through which the EU budget covers the first losses (up to 95% of the guarantee) and the EIB 
covers the marginal remaining losses (5%). This mitigates the EIB risk, thereby increasing its 
lending capacity. 
The European Commission also proposes the introduction of project bonds for infrastructure 
that  will  use  a  first-loss  portfolio  approach.  The  Project  Bond  Initiative  (PBI)  could  be  a 
significant  source  of  funding  for  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF),  as  well  as  other 
important future infrastructure projects – if its scope is expanded through bonds issued on 
the  capital  market  by  the  project  company.  Beyond  the  funding  allocated  to  the  risk 
guarantee, no budget risks exist. Nevertheless, the instrument needs to be tested.   
The  European Commission  is  improving  its  SME  support assistance under  the proposed 
Competitiveness  of  enterprises  and  SMEs  (COSME).  To  avoid  overlaps,  support  for 
innovative SMEs in COSME will be merged with the RSFF programme for SMEs (the Risk 
Sharing Initiative , RSI).  
The Commission is proposing significant improvements for all InFIs. In the next Multiannual 
Financial  Framework  (MFF),  overlaps  will  be  reduced  and  monitoring  improved,  while 
improved governance structures should increase coherence and transparency thorugh the 
new  debt  and  equity  platforms.  There  is,  however,  no  sure  indication  about  how  the 
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Inter-services  Expert  Group  (FIEG)  could  serve  as  a  base  for  these  platforms,  but  the 
relationship  between  the  FIEG  with  the  different  arms  of  the  budgetary  authorities  (the 
European  Parliament  and  the  European  Council)  and  its  relationship  with  the  financial 
institutions that are in charge of implementing the instruments needs to be improved.  
In order for the instruments to function efficiently and increase  their impact it must be 
possible  to  use  reflows  to  refinance  the  instruments  –  thereby  making  them  potentially 
budgetary neutral and self-financing.  
B) Financial instruments under the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
The scope for, and importance of, InFIs in delivering investments under the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds increased during the 2007–2013 period to include SMEs, sustainable urban 
development  planning  and  regeneration,  energy  efficiency  and  renewable  energy  in 
buildings. Assessing the performance of these InFIs is complicated, and experiences vary 
across different member states. Generally, one can conclude that to date, the up-take of InFIs 
under  shared  management  has  not  been  optimal.  This  is  due  to  the  cultural  shift  that  
managing authorities (MAs) and final beneficiaries had to make; the lack of awareness and 
understanding of the instruments; the creation of an appropriate institutional and regulatory 
framework; and issues regarding the capacity of the MA and the final recipients. There have 
also been issues of incoherence and instrument overlap; delays in the launching and delivery 
of  funds;  excessive  allocation  of  resources;  and  inadequate  or  incomplete  ex-ante 
assessments. The instruments' limited application reduced their potential to contribute to EU 
objectives and achieve a critical mass of investments in relation to SMEs, sustainable urban 
development and energy efficiency. 
Building  on  experience  from  the  2007–2013  period,  the  Commission  proposals  include 
expanding, innovating and strengthening the use of InFIs for the 2014–2020 EU Structural 
and  Cohesion  Funds.  The  scope  of  InFIs  will  be  expanded  to  all  types  of  projects  and 
activities, sectors and beneficiaries, and InFIs will be allowed under the Cohesion Fund for 
the first time. Member states and managing authorities (MA) will be able to use InFIs for all 
thematic objectives and priorities covered by Operational Programmes (OPs), as long as the 
economic viability of final recipients and the projects’ repayment capacity can be shown. The 
proposals remove the current prohibition of financing a project from more than one source 
and set out rules to allow InFIs to be combined with other forms of support, in particular 
grants.  
InFIs are to be designed on the basis of an ex-ante assessment identifying, inter alia, market 
gaps/failures  or  sub-optimal  investment  situations,  investment  needs,  potential  private 
sector involvement and the InFI’s added value, as well as questions of critical mass and 
possible economies of scale. The MA will be required to report on operations relating to the 
InFIs as an annex to the annual implementation report submitted to the Commission. Three 
implementation options are proposed for InFIs: 1) EU-level InFIs; 2) InFIs at the national or 
regional level; and 3) InFIs consisting solely of loans or guarantees. Technical assistance and 
guidance for advisory services and capacity building are to be provided to MAs and final 
recipients, but what exactly they involve is not clear.  
The  respective  shares  of  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and  the 
European Social Fund (ESF) that are used for InFIs will not be clear until the end of the 2014–
2020 programming period because they are a function of the uptake of the instruments by 
the MAs to implement the OPs. Some initial estimates by the Commission suggest that the 
potential volume of ERDF resources to be delivered through InFIs in the next programming 
period could increase by as much as a factor of three (to approximately 15%). The leverage 
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in which it is applied. Pooling the funds into one or a few multi-regional funds (such as one 
for Nordic countries), rather than allocating the money in separate regional isolated funds 
would increase both the risk spread and the leverage and multiplier effect. 
The  general  provisions  proposed  thus  far  should  address  shortcomings  identified  in  the 
implementation  of  existing  InFIs  under  shared  management.  Specific  details  of  the 
instruments are still under discussion. In particular, the delegated and implementing acts 
that  are  envisaged  for  the  2014–2020  period  might  include  important  provisions  on 
minimum requirements for the ex-ante assessment of InFIs; the blending of InFIs and grants; 
the  eligibility  of  expenditure;  and  the multiplier  ratios  to  be  ensured.  These  acts  will  be 
critical for ensuring effective and efficient implementation of the new provisions for using 
InFIs. The provisions for reporting on InFI operations will be key to improving transparency 
and useful for evaluating if the instruments actually function as they were envisaged.  
C) Financial instruments for external action 
In the area of external action, the EU has been using guarantees for EIB lending under ACP 
programmes  for  some  time.  But  the  new  ‘blending’  mechanisms  have  added  a  new 
dimension to external action. These facilities use EU funding – sometimes expanded with 
member states’ contributions – and are specifically designed to provide financial support to 
development  financiers  and  thus  mobilise  additional  funding  for  EU  development 
objectives.  
A large number of development banks and international financial institutions participate in 
the blending facilities to create multiplier effects that are often more than 20 times the EU’s 
contribution. One weakness of these facilities has been the ad hoc manner in which they 
were set up, often causing their procedures, monitoring and reporting to be different for 
reasons that cannot be justified by operational needs in the target regions. 
The  Commission  proposals  for  2014  to  2020  foresee  expanding  the  operations  of  these 
blending mechanisms, increasing both their financing and their geographical coverage. It 
also proposes creating an EU Platform for Cooperation and Development. 
While  the  ‘blending  mechanisms’  are  interesting  complements  to  the  EU  development 
policy, care must be taken to ensure that the use of debt instruments does not reduce the 
focus on the poorest or increase developing countries’ debt burdens to unsustainable levels. 
Key conclusions and recommendations 
The  financial  resources  needed  to  fulfil  the  objectives  for  SMEs,  energy,  climate  change, 
transport,  growth  and  employment,  research,  development  and  innovation,  and  external 
action are far beyond the capacity of the EU-budget’s traditional grant funding. Financial 
instruments can help the EU achieve its multiple objectives. 
The Commission proposals for financial instruments improve the way they function, but the 
future governance of these instruments and the  European Parliament’s role is still unclear. 
The introduction of the debt and equity platforms will help improve the coherence of the 
different instruments. However, more needs to be done in this regard. The instruments have 
very different structures as a result of their ad-hoc development, which also makes them less 
transparent. 
The  procedures  for  budgeting,  delegating  management,  awarding  funding,  monitoring, 
implementing  rules,  exposing  risk,  leveraging,  reporting  and  accounting  should  be 
presented  simply  and  transparently  in  easily  comparable  formats  for  all  financial 
instruments.  THE USE OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR EU POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES | 5 
 
The  proposed  debt  and  equity  platforms,  including  those  for  external  cooperation  and 
development, should be chaired and managed by one Commission service, preferably the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), as is the case for the 
FIEG. The platform should also include a steering committee that includes the Council and 
the European Parliament, as well as key stakeholders. 
The platforms must provide clear guidance for monitoring and evaluating the InFIs.  
InFIs must follow a market logic, for example allowing the reuse of reflows.  
The fragmented budget for InFIs in policy areas and regional budgets for Structural Funds, 
as well as the extremely conservative approach of a 100% capital requirement (meaning that 
the budget can always cover a total default of all the instruments), considerably limits the 
leverage potential. Funding guarantees for InFIs should be pooled in the largest possible 
fund (including regional funds) – even if that means that shares are allocated regionally. 
With a more realistic capital requirement (for example, a conservative risk coverage of 50%), 
the leverage and multiplier effect would increase dramatically.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
ie Ziele und Bestrebungen der Europäischen Union haben in den vergangen zwei 
Jahrzehnten beträchtlich zugenommen, während der Unionshaushalt – ausgedrückt 
in Prozent des BNE – real geschrumpft ist. Die Einführung von Finanzinstrumenten, 
die eine Unterstützung aus dem EU-Haushalt mit Darlehen der EIB-Gruppe (Europäische 
Investitionsbank  und  Europäischer  Investitionsfonds)  sowie  anderer  Finanzinstitute 
kombinieren,  ist  nur  als  ein  möglicher  Weg  zur  Ausweitung  der  Reichweite  des  EU-
Haushalts  und  zur  Steigerung  seiner  Effizienz  anzusehen.  Die  Finanz-  und 
Staatsschuldenkrise hat ebenfalls den Bedarf an neuen innovativen Finanzlösungen für den 
schwächelnden  Kreditmarkt  für  öffentliche  Infrastrukturen,  Forschung  und  Entwicklung 
(FuE) und kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU) verstärkt. Während Finanzinstrumente 
auf  EU-Ebene  nicht  das  Vakuum  füllen  können,  das  durch  die  Kreditklemme  und  die 
Staatsschuldenkrise entstanden ist, können sie spezifische Unterstützung im Hinblick auf 
Wachstum  und  die  Schaffung  von  Arbeitsplätzen  in  Bereichen  mit  einem  europäischen 
Mehrwert  leisten,  die  bedeutende  langfristige  Erträge  erbringen  können.  Darüber  hinaus 
schaffen  diese  Instrumente  einen  neuen  Raum  für  die  Zusammenarbeit  zwischen  den 
Einrichtungen und Machtebenen und ermöglichen die Zusammenlegung von Mitteln und 
die  Entwicklung  gemeinsamer  Standards  innerhalb  der  EU.  Diese  indirekten  Vorteile 
durchdachter Mechanismen können beträchtliche Effizienzvorteile schaffen.  
Während des aktuellen mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens (MFR) für den Zeitraum von 2007 bis 
2013 wurde eine beispiellose Zahl (über 20) so genannter „innovativer Finanzinstrumente“ 
(InFI) eingeführt. Obwohl nur 1,3 % der EU-Haushaltsmittel diesen Instrumenten zugeteilt 
wurde, ermöglicht dieser verhältnismäßig geringe Betrag der Europäischen Investitionsbank 
(EIB)  und  anderen  Kreditgebern,  den  ursprünglichen  Haushaltsbeitrag  in  Form  von 
Darlehen  bestimmten  Fällen  mehr  als  zu  verdreißigfachen.  Auf  der  Grundlage  positiver 
Bewertungen dieser Instrumente schlägt die Europäische Kommission daher vor, die Größe 
und  die  Möglichkeiten  der  bestehenden  Instrumente  auszuweiten,  bestimmte  ehrgeizige 
neue  Instrumente  einzuführen  sowie  deren  allgemeine  Auslieferungsarchitektur  zu 
reformieren und zu konsolidieren.  
Obwohl der Erfolg dieser Finanzinstrumente große Erwartungen geweckt hat, ist unbedingt 
zu  bedenken,  dass  InFI  nur  für  Projekte  mit  einer  potenziell  einträglichen  Finanzrendite 
geeignet sind. Sie sollten nicht als Ersatz für Zuschüsse betrachtet werden, sondern vielmehr 
als  Mittel  zur  Verbesserung  der  Reichweite  des  EU-Haushalts.  Es  muss  stärker 
unterschieden  werden  zwischen  Projekten,  die  Zuschüsse  benötigen,  und  Projekten,  die 
(zumindest teilweise) mit Darlehen finanziert werden können. InFIs, die Zuschüsse – zur 
Verringerung der Gesamtkosten und –risiken von Projekten – und Darlehen miteinander 
kombinieren,  tragen  dazu  bei,  die  Bonitätseinstufung  von  Projekten  anzuheben,  die 
andernfalls  nicht  hätten  durchgeführt  werden  können.  Zuschusskomponenten  ziehen 
Finanzierungsquellen an. 
InFI können nur für Projekte mit einem hohen europäischen Mehrwert verwendet werden, 
bei  denen  die  interne  Rendite  (IRR)  entweder  annähernd  positiv  oder  positiv,  jedoch 
aufgrund Marktversagen, einer langen Laufzeit oder anderer Hindernisse, die durch InFI 
reduziert werden können, nicht hoch genug ist, um Finanzquellen anzuziehen.  
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Während  Finanzinstrumente  vom  Markt  bestimmt  werden  und  ihre  Konzeption  eine 
bestimmte  Flexibilität  erfordert,  um  sich  auf  die  sich  verändernden  Marktanforderungen 
einzustellen, muss ihr europäischer Mehrwert sichergestellt werden und sie müssen eng auf 
die Einhaltung der Ziele der EU-Politik ausgerichtet sein.  Diese Finanzinstrumente müssen 
zur Erreichung der EU-Ziele auch möglichst viel Kapital mobilisieren, d. h. einen starken 
Multiplikatoreffekt haben und europäischen Mehrwert bewirken. 
Es werden Governance-Strukturen für die in der Entwicklung befindlichen Plattformen für 
Fremd- und Eigenkapitalfinanzierungen konzipiert, die zur Sicherstellung von effizienten 
InFI wichtig sind. Der Risikoumfang der Finanzinstrumente und der Zuschüsse ist abhängig 
vom Umsetzungsrahmen, der unter anderem aus dem Auswahlverfahren für die Projekte 
und  den  innerhalb  der  Plattformen  für  Fremd-  und  Eigenkapitalfinanzierungen 
beschlossenen Governance-Strukturen besteht. Anstatt einen restriktiven Rechtsrahmen im 
Hinblick  auf  den  Typ  der  Unterstützung  und  der  Begünstigten  zu  schaffen,  sollten  der 
Schwerpunkt der Instrumente, die politischen Ziele und die Überwachung verstärkt werden. 
Die InFI können in drei Gruppen aufgeteilt werden: Instrumente für interne Politikbereiche, 
die von der Europäischen Kommission verwaltet werden; Instrumente unter gemeinsamer 
Verwaltung,  die  von  den  Mitgliedstaaten  kontrolliert  werden  (Struktur-  und 
Kohäsionsfonds);  Finanzinstrumente  für  außenpolitisches  Handeln.  Obwohl  Details  der 
Strukturen für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 noch nicht bekannt sind, schlägt die Kommission 
generell  vor,  die  InFI  während  des  Zeitraums  2014-2020  zu  restrukturieren  und  zu 
konsolidieren,  ihren  Umfang  zu  erweitern  und  neue  Instrumente  einschließlich  der 
Projektanleihen  zu  schaffen.  Mit  dieser  Umstrukturierung  soll  versucht  werden,  den 
Schwächen zu begegnen, die bei den Evaluierungen der derzeitigen Instrumente aufgedeckt 
wurden, auch denen, die daher rühren, dass eine große Zahl von Instrumenten unabhängig 
voneinander entwickelt wurden, was zu unnötigen Divergenzen zwischen den Instrumenten 
und zu Überschneidungen geführt hat. 
A) Innovative Finanzinstrumente unter zentraler Verwaltung 
Zur  Erreichung  der  Ziele  der  Strategie  Europa 2020  hat  die  EU  vorgeschlagen, 
Finanzinstrumente unter zentraler Kontrolle in sechs Instrumenten zu konsolidieren. Diese 
Instrumente umfassen die Fazilität für Finanzierungen auf Risikoteilungsbasis für Forschung 
und  Innovation;  Eigenkapital  und  Garantien  für  innovative  KMU,  Mikrofinanzierungen, 
Bildung und Kultur; Instrumente für Transport und Energie.  
Die neuen Vorschläge stärken die Schuldeninstrumente unter Heranziehung eines Portfolio-
Ansatzes  auf  der  Grundlage  des  neuen  Modells  zur  Risikoteilung  für  die  Fazilität  für 
Finanzierungen auf Risikoteilungsbasis (RSFF). Die Risikoverteilung zwischen der EIB und 
dem  EU-Haushalt  in  den  internen  Politikbereichen  erfolgte  nach  dem  Prinzip  der 
Gleichrangigkeit, was bedeutet, dass die Garantierisiken gleichmäßig auf die EU und die EIB 
aufgeteilt  wurden.  Bei  der  RSFF  für  Forschung  und  Innovation  decken  die  EIB  und  die 
Kommission beispielsweise jeweils 50 % der Garantie ab. Künftig wird der Portfolio-Ansatz 
jedoch über einen Erstverlust-Mechanismus verfügen, in dessen Rahmen der EU-Haushalt 
den Erstverlust abdeckt (bis zu 95 % der Garantie), während die EIB den Restverlust (5 %) 
abdeckt. Dies verringert das Risiko der EIB und stärkt so ihre Kreditvergabekapazität. 
Die  Europäische  Kommission  schlägt  ebenfalls  die  Einführung  von  Projektanleihen  für 
Infrastrukturen vor, für die ein Erstverlust-Portfolio-Ansatz verwendet wird. Die Initiative 
zu  den  Projektanleihen  könnte  eine  beträchtliche  Finanzierungsquelle  für  die  Fazilität 
„Connecting Europe“ sowie für andere wichtige zukünftige Infrastrukturprojekte sein, falls 
ihr  Umfang  durch  die  Ausgabe  von  Anleihen  auf  dem  Kapitalmarkt  durch  das 
Projektunternehmen ausgeweitet wird. Es bestehen keine Risiken für den Haushalt, die über 8 | ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
die Finanzierung, die der Risikogarantie zugewiesen wurde, hinausgehen. Trotzdem muss 
das Instrument getestet werden.   
Die Europäische Kommission verbessert ihre Unterstützung für die KMU im Rahmen des 
Programms für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Unternehmen und für KMU (COSME). Um 
Überschneidungen zu vermeiden, wird die Unterstützung innovativer KMU in COSME mit 
dem KMU-Programm im Rahmen der RSFF zusammengelegt.  
Die  Kommission  schlägt  erhebliche  Verbesserungen  für  alle  InFI  vor.  Im  nächsten 
mehrjährigen  Finanzrahmen  (MFR)  werden  Überschneidungen  reduziert  und  die 
Überwachung  verbessert,  während  sich  mit  besseren  Governance-Strukturen  durch  die 
neuen Plattformen für Fremd- und Eigenkapitalfinanzierungen Kohärenz und Transparenz 
verbessern  sollten.  Es  gibt  jedoch  keine  sicheren  Hinweise  darauf,  wie  die  Plattformen 
tatsächlich funktionieren werden. Die neue dienststellenübergreifende Expertengruppe für 
Finanzinstrumente  (FIEG)  der  Europäischen  Kommission  könnte  als  Grundlage  für  den 
Aufbau dieser Plattformen dienen, allerdings ist im Hinblick auf die Beziehungen zwischen 
der FIEG und den verschiedenen Teilen der Haushaltsbehörde (Europäisches Parlament und 
Rat)  und  ihre  Beziehungen  zu  den  Finanzinstitutionen,  die  mit  der  Umsetzung  der 
Instrumente beauftragt sind, noch Einiges zu verbessern.  
Für das effiziente Funktionieren der Instrumente und die Steigerung ihrer Wirkung müssen 
Rückflüsse für die Refinanzierung der Instrumente genutzt werden – wodurch sie potenziell 
haushaltsneutral gestaltet werden und sich selbst finanzieren können.  
B) Finanzinstrumente im Rahmen der Struktur- und Kohäsionsfonds 
Der  Umfang  und  die  Bedeutung  von  InFI  für  die  Bereitstellung  von  Investitionen  im 
Rahmen der Struktur- und Kohäsionsfonds erhöhte sich während des Zeitraums von 2007-
2013,  um  KMU,  eine  nachhaltige  Planung  für  städtische  Entwicklung  und  Sanierung, 
Energieeffizienz und erneuerbare Energiequellen in Gebäuden aufzunehmen. Die Bewertung 
der  Leistung  dieser  InFI  ist  schwierig  und  die  Erfahrungen  sind  in  den  einzelnen 
Mitgliedstaaten  unterschiedlich.  Allgemein  kann  festgestellt  werden,  dass  die 
Inanspruchnahme  der  InFI  unter  gemeinsamer  Verwaltung  bis  zum  aktuellen  Zeitpunkt 
nicht optimal war. Dies ist unter anderem zurückzuführen auf den kulturellen Wandel, der 
bei den Verwaltungsbehörden und den Begünstigten stattfinden musste, auf einen Mangel 
an Sensibilisierung und an Verständnis der Instrumente, auf die Schaffung eines geeigneten 
institutionellen  und  rechtlichen  Rahmens  sowie  auf  Kapazitätsprobleme  bei  den 
Verwaltungsbehörden  und  bei  den  Endempfängern.  Es gab  ebenfalls  Probleme  aufgrund 
Inkohärenz und Überschneidungen zwischen Instrumenten, Verzögerungen bei der Auflage 
und Bereitstellung von Fonds, übermäßiger Zuteilungen von Mitteln und unangemessener 
oder unvollständiger Vorab-Bewertungen. Die eingeschränkte Anwendung der Instrumente 
bedeutete,  dass  ihr  Potenzial  im  Hinblick  auf  den  Beitrag  zu  den  EU-Zielen  und  zur 
Erreichung einer kritischen Masse von Investitionen in KMU, in die nachhaltige städtische 
Entwicklung und in die Energieeffizienz geschmälert wurde. 
Aufbauend auf den während des Zeitraums 2007-2013 gewonnenen Erfahrungen schlägt die 
Kommission unter anderem vor, die EU-Strukturfonds und den EU-Kohäsionsfonds 2014-
2020  zu  erweitern,  einige  Neuerungen  einzuführen  und  die  Verwendung  von  InFI  zu 
stärken. Der Umfang der InFI wird auf alle Typen von Projekten, Aktivitäten, Sektoren und 
Empfänger erweitert, und die Verwendung der InFI wird erstmals auch im Rahmen des 
Kohäsionsfonds gestattet. Die Mitgliedstaaten und die Verwaltungsbehörden werden in der 
Lage sein, InFI im Hinblick auf alle thematischen Ziele und Prioritäten zu verwenden, die 
durch  operationelle  Programme  abgedeckt  werden,  sofern  die  wirtschaftliche 
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nachgewiesen  werden  kann.  Die  Vorschläge  ersetzen  die  aktuelle  Bestimmung,  dass  ein 
Projekt nicht aus mehr als einer Quelle finanziert werden darf, und legen Vorschriften fest, 
mit denen die Kombination von InFI mit anderen Formen der Unterstützung, insbesondere 
Zuschüssen, ermöglicht wird.  
InFI sind auf der Grundlage einer Vorab-Bewertung zu konzipieren, in deren Rahmen u. a. 
Marktlücken/Marktversagen oder nicht optimale Investitionssituationen, Investitionsbedarf, 
eine potenzielle Beteiligung des privaten Sektors, der Mehrwert der InFI sowie Fragen der 
kritischen  Masse  und  Möglichkeiten  für  Skaleneffekte  festgestellt  werden.  Die 
Verwaltungsbehörden  müssen  ebenfalls  einen  Bericht  über  die  Operationen  im 
Zusammenhang  mit  InFI  als  Anhang  zum  jährlichen  Umsetzungsbericht,  der  an  die 
Kommission  geschickt  wird,  übermitteln.  Für  InFI  werden  drei  Umsetzungsoptionen 
vorgeschlagen: 1) auf EU-Ebene eingerichtete InFI; 2) auf der nationalen bzw. regionalen 
Ebene eingerichtete InFI; 3) ausschließlich aus Darlehen oder Garantien bestehende InFI. Den 
Verwaltungsbehörden und den Endempfängern sind technische Unterstützung und Leitung 
für Beratungsservice und den Kapazitätsaufbau bereitzustellen, obwohl die diesbezüglichen 
Details nicht klar sind.  
Der  jeweilige  Anteil  des  Europäischen  Fonds  für  regionale  Entwicklung  (EFRE)  und  des 
Europäischen Sozialfonds (ESF), der für die InFI verwendet wird, wird erst gegen Ende des 
Programmplanungszeitraums 2014-2020 bekannt sein, da dies davon abhängt, inwieweit die 
Instrumente  zur  Umsetzung  der  operativen  Programme  durch  die  Verwaltungsbehörden 
angenommen  werden.  Anfängliche  Schätzungen  der  Kommission  legen  nahe,  dass  der 
Umfang  der  EFRE-Mittel,  die  potenziell  während  des  nächsten 
Programmplanungszeitraums im Rahmen von InFI bereitgestellt werden könnten, auf das 
Dreifache  (auf  etwa  15 Prozent)  anwachsen  könnte.  Der  Hebeleffekt  hängt  von  den 
verwendeten  InFI,  den  speziellen  Finanzprodukten  und  dem  Sektor,  auf  dem  diese 
angewendet  werden,  ab.  Die  Zusammenlegung  der  Fonds  in  einen  oder  mehrere 
multiregionale Fonds (beispielsweise einen Fonds für die nordischen Länder etc.) statt der 
Aufteilung der Gelder in getrennte regionale Fonds würde die Risikostreuung sowie den 
Hebel- und Multiplikatoreffekt vergrößern. 
Die  bisher  vorgeschlagenen  allgemeinen  Bestimmungen  sollten  den  Mängeln 
entgegenwirken,  die  bei  der  Umsetzung  der  bestehenden  InFI  unter  gemeinsamer 
Verwaltung festgestellt wurden. Die spezifischen Details dieser Instrumente werden noch 
diskutiert.  Insbesondere  können  die  geplanten  delegierten  Rechtsakte  und 
Durchführungsrechtsakte für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 wichtige Bestimmungen über u. a. die 
Mindestanforderungen  der  Vorab-Bewertungen  der  InFI,  die  Mischung  von  InFI  und 
Zuschüssen,  die  Förderfähigkeit  von  Ausgaben  und  die  sicherzustellenden 
Multiplikatorquoten umfassen. Diese Akte sind wichtig für die Sicherstellung der effektiven 
und effizienten Umsetzung der neuen Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von InFI. Die 
Bestimmungen über die Berichte über Operationen im Zusammenhang mit InFI sind wichtig 
zur  Verbesserung  der  Transparenz  und  nützlich  für  die  Bewertung,  ob  die  Instrumente 
tatsächlich so funktionieren wie vorgesehen.  
C) Finanzinstrumente für außenpolitisches Handeln 
Im Bereich des außenpolitischen Handelns hat die EU während eines bestimmten Zeitraums 
Garantien  für  EIB-Kredite  im  Rahmen  der  AKP-Programme  verwendet.  Die  neuen 
„Mischmechanismen“  haben  jedoch  eine  zusätzliche  Dimension  in  das  außenpolitische 
Handeln eingeführt. Diese Fazilitäten verwenden EU-Finanzierungen – bisweilen erweitert 
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Unterstützung  an  Entwicklungsfinanzierer  ausgerichtet  und  mobilisieren  so  zusätzliche 
Finanzierungen für die EU-Entwicklungsziele.  
Eine große Zahl an Entwicklungsbanken und internationalen Finanzinstituten sind an den 
gemischten Fazilitäten beteiligt, die Multiplikatoreffekte bewirken, die den EU-Beitrag oft 
um das 20-Fache übersteigen. Eine Schwäche der Fazilitäten besteht jedoch in der Ad-hoc-
Manier,  mit  der  diese  aufgelegt  wurden,  was  dazu  führte,  dass  die  Verfahren,  die 
Überwachung  und  die  Berichterstattung  für  die  Fazilitäten  aus  Gründen,  die  nicht  mit 
operativen Erfordernissen in den Zielregionen zu rechtfertigen sind, oft unterschiedlich sind. 
Die Kommissionsvorschläge für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 sehen vor, die Operationen dieser 
Mischmechanismen  zu  erweitern,  die  ihnen  zugeteilten  Mittel  zu  erhöhen  und  ihre 
geografische  Bandbreite  auszuweiten.  Die  Kommission  schlägt  ebenfalls  die  Einrichtung 
einer EU-Plattform für Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung vor. 
Während die „Mischmechanismen“ interessante Ergänzungen zu der Entwicklungspolitik 
der EU darstellen, ist Sorgfalt angebracht, um sicherzustellen, dass die Verwendung von 
Schuldeninstrumenten  nicht  den  Schwerpunkt  von  den  Ärmsten  abwendet  und  die 
Verschuldung der Entwicklungsländer nicht auf untragbare Weise vergrößert wird. 
Wichtigste Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen 
Die erforderlichen Finanzmittel, um mit einer traditionellen Zuschussfinanzierung die Ziele 
in  den  Bereichen  KMU,  Energie,  Klimawandel,  Verkehr,  Wachstum  und  Beschäftigung, 
Forschung,  Entwicklung  und  Innovation  sowie  außenpolitisches  Handeln  zu  erfüllen, 
übersteigen die Kapazität des EU-Haushalts bei weitem. Finanzinstrumente können die EU 
bei der Erreichung ihrer vielfältigen Ziele unterstützen. 
Die Vorschläge der Kommission zu den Finanzinstrumenten verbessern das Funktionieren 
dieser Instrumente, allerdings ist immer noch unklar, wie die künftige Governance dieser 
Instrumente aussehen und welche Rolle das Europäische Parlament dabei spielen soll. 
Die  Einführung  der  Plattformen  für  Fremd-  und  Eigenkapitalfinanzierungen  wird  dazu 
beitragen,  die  Kohärenz  der  verschiedenen  Instrumente  zu  verbessern.  Allerdings  muss 
diesbezüglich  noch  mehr  geschehen.  Die  Instrumente  haben  aufgrund  ihrer  Ad-hoc-
Entwicklung sehr unterschiedliche Strukturen, weshalb sie auch weniger transparent sind. 
Die Verfahren im Hinblick auf die Einbeziehung in den Haushaltsplan, die Übertragung der 
Mittelbewirtschaftung,  die  Mittelvergabe,  die  Überwachungsverfahren,  die 
Durchführungsbestimmungen,  die  Risikoexposition,  die  Hebelwirkung,  die 
Rechnungslegung  und  Berichterstattung  sollten  auf  einfache  und  transparente  Weise  in 
einem für alle Finanzinstrumente vergleichbaren Format vorgestellt werden.  
Die vorgeschlagenen Plattformen für Fremd- und Eigenkapitalfinanzierungen einschließlich 
der Plattformen für außenpolitische Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung sollten unter dem 
Vorsitz  einer  Dienststelle  der  Kommission,  vorzugsweise  der  Generaldirektion  für 
Wirtschaft  und  Finanzen  (GD  ECFIN),  verwaltet  werden,  wie  es  im  Hinblick  auf  die 
dienststellenübergreifende Expertengruppe für Finanzinstrumente der Fall ist. Die Plattform 
sollte  auch  einen  Lenkungsausschuss  einschließlich  des  Rates  und  des  Europäischen 
Parlaments sowie wichtiger Interessengruppen umfassen. 
Die  Plattformen  müssen  klare  Vorgaben  für  die  Überwachung  und  Bewertung  der  InFI 
bereitstellen.  
InFI müssen einer Marktlogik folgen, indem man beispielsweise die Wiederverwendung von 
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Der  fragmentierte  Haushalt  für  InFI  in  Politikbereichen  und  Regionalhaushalten  für  die 
Strukturfonds  sowie  der  extrem  konservative  Ansatz  einer  Eigenkapitalanforderung  von 
100 % (das heißt, dass der Haushalt immer einen totalen Zahlungsausfall aller Instrumente 
abdecken  kann)  schränkt  die  mögliche  Hebelwirkung  beträchtlich  ein.  Die  Mittel  für  die 
Garantien  von  InFI  sollten  in  einem  möglichst  großen  Fonds  (einschließlich  der 
Regionalfonds) zusammengelegt werden, auch wenn die Anteile dann regional zugewiesen 
werden. Mit einer realistischeren Eigenkapitalanforderung (beispielsweise eine konservative 
Risikoabdeckung  von  50 %)  könnten  die  Hebelwirkung  und  der  Multiplikatoreffekt 
wesentlich gesteigert werden.  
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SYNTHÈSE  
es objectifs et les aspirations de l’Union européenne ont considérablement augmenté 
au cours des deux dernières décennies, alors que le budget de l’Union a diminué en 
termes  réels  en  pourcentage  du  revenu  national  brut  (RNB).  L’introduction 
d’instruments financiers combinant un soutien du budget de l’Union européenne et des prêts 
accordés par le groupe BEI (la Banque européenne d’investissement et le Fonds européen 
d’investissement), ainsi que par d’autres institutions financières, est considérée comme un 
moyen d’élargir la portée du budget de l’Union européenne et d’en accroître l’efficacité. La 
crise financière et la crise de la dette souveraine ont également conduit à un besoin accru de 
nouvelles solutions financières innovantes pour répondre à l’affaiblissement du marché du 
crédit qui affecte les infrastructures publiques, la recherche et développement et les PME. Si 
les  instruments  financiers  à  l’échelle  de  l’Union  européenne  ne  sont  pas  en  mesure  de 
combler le vide créé par le resserrement du crédit et par la crise de la dette souveraine, ils 
peuvent offrir un soutien spécifique en matière de croissance et de création d’emplois dans 
les zones présentant une valeur ajoutée européenne et capables de procurer des rendements 
à long terme importants. En outre, ces instruments créent un nouvel espace de collaboration 
entre les institutions et les niveaux de pouvoir et facilitent la mise en commun des ressources 
et  l’élaboration  de  normes  communes  à  l’ensemble  de  l’Union  européenne.  Ces  bienfaits 
indirects de mécanismes bien conçus peuvent créer des économies d’échelle considérables.  
Le  cadre  financier  pluriannuel  (CFP)  en  cours  pour  la  période  allant  de  2007  à  2013  a 
introduit un nombre sans précédent d’instruments (plus de 20) dits "instruments financiers 
innovants". Bien que seulement 1,3 % des ressources budgétaires de l’UE aient été affectées à 
ces instruments, ce montant relativement peu élevé permet, dans certains cas, à la Banque 
européenne d'investissement (BEI) et à d’autres sources de financement de multiplier par 
plus de 30 la contribution budgétaire d’origine sous forme de prêts. Les évaluations positives 
de ces instruments ont poussé la Commission européenne à proposer d’élargir la taille et la 
portée de ces instruments existants, d’introduire des instruments nouveaux et ambitieux et 
de réformer et consolider leur architecture d’octroi globale.  
Bien que le succès de ces instruments financiers ait créé de grandes attentes, il est important 
de garder à l’esprit que les instruments financiers innovants ne conviennent qu’à des projets 
qui présentent un rendement financier potentiel positif. Ils ne doivent pas être considérés 
comme un remplacement des subventions, mais comme des instruments qui élargissent la 
portée du budget de l’Union européenne. Une meilleure distinction doit être opérée entre les 
projets  qui  ont  besoin  de  subventions  et  ceux  qui  peuvent  être  financés  au  moins 
partiellement  par  des  prêts.  Les  instruments  financiers  innovants  qui  combinent  des 
subventions  –  afin  de  réduire  le  coût  et  le  risque  globaux  des  projets  –  et  des  prêts 
contribuent à élever la cote de crédit de projets qui, autrement, n'auraient pas été entrepris. 
La composante de subventions attire les financiers. 
Les  instruments  financiers  innovants  ne  peuvent  être  utilisés  qu’avec  des  projets  qui 
présentent une valeur ajoutée européenne élevée et dont le taux de rendement interne (TRI) 
est  presque  positif  ou  positif,  mais  pas  suffisamment  élevé  pour  attirer  les  financiers  en 
raison  de  défaillances  du  marché,  d’une  échéance  lointaine  ou  d’autres  obstacles  que  les 
instruments financiers innovants peuvent réduire.  
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Bien que les instruments financiers soient axés sur le marché et que leur conception exige un 
certain  degré  de  souplesse  pour  faire  face  aux  besoins  changeants  du  marché,  il  est 
nécessaire de veiller à ce qu’ils présentent une véritable valeur ajoutée européenne et à ce 
qu’ils soient  étroitement  alignés sur  la  réalisation  des  objectifs politiques  de  l’UE.    Il  est 
également  important  que  ces  instruments  financiers  mobilisent  autant  de  capitaux  que 
possible en vue de la réalisation des objectifs de l’UE, c’est-à-dire qu’ils présentent un effet 
multiplicateur élevé et une valeur ajoutée européenne. 
Des structures de gouvernance seront conçues pour les futures plateformes d’instruments de 
capital et de dette; ces structures seront importantes pour assurer l’efficacité des instruments 
financiers  innovants.  Le  niveau  de  risque  des  instruments  financiers  et  des  subventions 
dépend du cadre de mise en œuvre, y compris de la procédure de sélection de projet et des 
structures de gouvernance établies dans le cadre des plateformes d’instruments de capital et 
de dette. Au lieu de créer un cadre réglementaire restrictif concernant le type de soutien et de 
bénéficiaire, il faut renforcer la focalisation des instruments, des objectifs politiques et du 
suivi. 
Les instruments financiers innovants peuvent être classés en trois groupes selon leur fin: les 
instruments  pour  les  politiques  internes  gérés  par  la  Commission  européenne;  les 
instruments en gestion partagée sous le contrôle des États membres (Fonds structurels et de 
cohésion);  et  les  instruments  financiers  pour  l’action  extérieure.  Même  si  les  détails 
spécifiques  des structures  pour  la  période  2014-2020  ne sont pas  connus,  la  Commission 
propose de restructurer et de consolider les instruments financiers innovants au cours de la 
période  2014-2020,  en  élargissant  leur  portée  et  en  créant  de  nouveaux  instruments,  y 
compris  l’initiative  d’emprunts  obligataires.  Cette  restructuration  visera  à  combler  les 
lacunes révélées par les évaluations des instruments actuels, notamment les incohérences 
découlant de l’existence d’un nombre élevé d’instruments élaborés indépendamment les uns 
des  autres,  ce  qui  mène  à  des  divergences  inutiles  et  à  des  chevauchements  entre  les 
instruments. 
A) Les instruments financiers innovants faisant l’objet d’une gestion centralisée 
En vue d’atteindre les objectifs de sa stratégie Europe 2020, l'Union européenne propose de 
regrouper  en  six  instruments  les  instruments  financiers  faisant  l'objet  d'une  gestion 
centralisée.  Ces instruments sont le mécanisme de financement avec partage des risques 
(MFPR) pour la recherche et l'innovation, les instruments de capital et les garanties pour les 
PME  innovantes,  la  microfinance,  l’éducation  et  la  culture;  et  les  instruments  pour  le 
transport et l’énergie.  
Les  nouvelles  propositions  renforcent  les  titres  de  créance  grâce  à  une  approche  de 
portefeuille fondée sur le nouveau modèle de partage des risques pour le mécanisme de 
financement  avec  partage  des  risques  (MFPR).  Précédemment,  la  répartition  des  risques 
entre la BEI et le budget de l’UE dans les politiques internes était conçue selon le principe 
"pari passu", ce qui signifie que les risques de la garantie sont partagés à parts égales entre 
l’UE et la BEI. Dans le MFPR pour la recherche et l’innovation, par exemple, la BEI et la 
Commission  couvrent  chacune  50 %  de  la  garantie.  À  l’avenir,  toutefois,  l’approche  de 
portefeuille  comportera  un mécanisme  "premières  pertes" selon  lequel  le  budget  de  l’UE 
couvre  les  premières pertes  (jusqu’à  95 %  de  la  garantie)  et  la  BEI  les  pertes  marginales 
restantes (5 %). Ceci atténue le risque supporté par la BEI et augmente ainsi sa capacité de 
prêt. 
La Commission européenne propose également l’introduction d’emprunts obligataires pour 
des projets d’infrastructure, qui utiliseront une approche de portefeuille "premières pertes". 
L’initiative  des  emprunts  obligataires  pourrait  constituer  une  source  de  financement 14 | SYNTHESE 
 
considérable  pour  le  mécanisme  pour  l’interconnexion  en  Europe  (MIE),  ainsi  que  pour 
d’autres infrastructures importantes à l’avenir, si son champ d’application est élargi via des 
financements  levés sur  le  marché  de  capitaux  moyennant  l’émission  d’obligations  par  la 
société de projet. Au-delà du financement affecté à la garantie des risques, les risques pour le 
budget sont inexistants. Néanmoins, l'instrument doit être testé.   
La  Commission  européenne  améliore  son  soutien  aux  PME  dans  le  cadre  du  projet  de 
programme  pour  la  compétitivité  des  entreprises  et  des  PME  (COSME).  Pour  éviter  les 
chevauchements, le soutien apporté aux PME innovantes par le programme COSME sera 
fusionné  avec  le  programme  pour  les  PME  au  titre  du  MFPR  (initiative  de  partage  des 
risques).  
La Commission propose des améliorations considérables de tous les instruments financiers 
innovants. Dans le prochain cadre financier pluriannuel (CFP), les chevauchements seront 
réduits et le suivi amélioré, alors que la création de meilleures structures de gouvernance 
devrait également conduire à davantage de cohérence et de transparence avec les nouvelles 
plateformes d’instruments de capital et de dette.  Cependant, on ne sait pas avec certitude 
comment les plateformes vont fonctionner dans la pratique. Le groupe d’experts interservice 
sur les instruments financiers (FIEG) récemment créé par la Commission peut constituer une 
base pour ces plateformes, mais il faut améliorer les relations entre le FIEG et les différentes 
branches des autorités budgétaires (Parlement européen et Conseil) et entre le FIEG et les 
institutions financières en charge de la mise en œuvre des instruments.  
Pour assurer le bon fonctionnement des instruments et l’accroissement de leur impact, il doit 
être possible d’utiliser les remboursements pour refinancer les instruments, ce qui les rend 
potentiellement neutres d’un point de vue budgétaire et autofinancés.  
B) Les instruments financiers au titre des Fonds structurels et de cohésion 
La  portée  et  l’importance  des  instruments  financiers  innovants  pour  effectuer  des 
investissements au titre des Fonds structurels et de cohésion ont progressé au cours de la 
période  2007-2013  pour  inclure  les  PME,  la  planification  et  la  régénération  du 
développement  urbain  durable,  l’efficacité  énergétique  et  l’énergie  renouvelable  dans  les 
bâtiments. Il est compliqué d’évaluer la performance de ces instruments financiers innovants 
et les expériences varient selon les États membres. Globalement, il est possible de conclure 
qu’à ce jour, l’adoption des instruments financiers innovants en gestion partagée est loin 
d’être  optimale.  Ceci  découle  du  changement  culturel  qui  a  dû  intervenir  au  sein  des 
autorités de gestion et parmi les bénéficiaires finaux; du manque de sensibilisation et de 
compréhension  des  instruments;  de  la  création d’un  cadre  institutionnel  et  réglementaire 
approprié;  et  de  problèmes  de  capacité  au  sein  des  autorités  de  gestion  et  parmi  les 
bénéficiaires finaux. Il y a également eu des problèmes d’incohérence et de chevauchement 
entre les instruments; des retards dans le lancement et la mise à disposition des fonds; des 
cas  d’affectation  excédentaire  des  ressources;  et  des  évaluations  ex ante  inadaptées  ou 
incomplètes. Du fait de la mise en œuvre limitée des instruments, leur potentiel en matière 
de  contribution  aux  objectifs  de  l’Union  européenne  et  d’atteinte  d’une  masse  critique 
d’investissements en relation avec les PME, le développement urbain durable et l’efficacité 
énergétique a été réduit. 
S’appuyant  sur  l’expérience  acquise  au  cours  de  la  période  2007-2013,  la  Commission 
propose  d'élargir,  de  renouveler  et  de  renforcer  l’utilisation  des  instruments  financiers 
innovants pour les Fonds structurels et de cohésion de l’Union européenne pour la période 
2014-2020. La portée des instruments financiers innovants sera élargie à tous les types de 
projets,  d’activités,  de  secteurs  et  de  bénéficiaires  et  les  instruments  financiers  innovants 
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États  membres  et  les  autorités  de  gestion  seront  en  mesure  d’utiliser  les  instruments 
financiers innovants pour l’ensemble des objectifs thématiques et des priorités couverts par 
les  programmes  opérationnels  (PO),  sous  réserve  que  soient  démontrées  la  viabilité 
économique  des  bénéficiaires  finaux  et  la  capacité  de  remboursement  des  projets.  Les 
propositions suppriment l'interdiction actuelle de financer un projet par plus d’une source et 
établissent des règles visant à permettre la combinaison d’instruments financiers innovants 
et d’autres formes de soutien, en particulier des subventions.  
Les instruments financiers innovants seront conçus sur la base d’une évaluation ex ante qui 
identifie notamment les lacunes et défaillances du marché ou les situations d’investissement 
sous-optimales, les besoins d’investissement, la participation potentielle du secteur privé, la 
valeur ajoutée de l’instrument financier innovant ainsi que les questions de masse critique et 
de possibles économies d’échelle. Il sera également demandé aux autorités de gestion de 
faire état des opérations relatives aux instruments financiers innovants dans une annexe au 
rapport annuel d’exécution transmis à la Commission. Trois options de mise en œuvre sont 
proposées pour les instruments financiers innovants: 1) instruments financiers innovants à 
l’échelle de l’Union européenne; 2) instruments financiers innovants à l’échelle nationale ou 
régionale;  et  3)  instruments  financiers  innovants  constitués  uniquement  de  prêts  ou  de 
garanties. Les autorités de gestion et les bénéficiaires finaux bénéficieront d’une assistance 
technique et de conseils en matière de services consultatifs et de renforcement des capacités, 
mais le contenu de ces prestations n'est pas connu avec précision.  
Les  parts  du  Fonds  européen  de  développement  régional  (FEDER)  et  du  Fonds  social 
européen  (FSE)  qui  seront  utilisées  pour  les  instruments  financiers  innovants  ne  seront 
connues qu’à la fin de la période de programmation 2014-2020 puisqu’elles dépendent de 
l’adoption des instruments par les autorités de gestion dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des 
programmes opérationnels. Certaines estimations initiales de la Commission suggèrent que 
le  volume  potentiel  des  ressources  du  FEDER  qui  pourraient  être  fournies  au  moyen 
d’instruments  financiers  innovants  au  cours  de  la  prochaine  période  de  programmation 
pourrait connaître une augmentation allant jusqu’à un triplement (c’est-à-dire jusqu’à 15 % 
environ). L’effet de levier dépendra de l’instrument financier innovant utilisé, des produits 
financiers spécifiques élaborés et du secteur d’application. La mise en commun des fonds au 
sein d’un seul ou d’un petit nombre de fonds multirégionaux (par exemple un pour les pays 
nordiques), plutôt que la répartition de ces fonds dans des fonds régionaux distincts et isolés, 
améliorerait la répartition des risques ainsi que l’effet de levier et l’effet multiplicateur. 
Les dispositions générales proposées à ce jour devraient contribuer à combler les lacunes 
identifiées dans la mise en œuvre des instruments financiers innovants en gestion partagée 
existants. Les modalités spécifiques de ces instruments sont encore en cours de discussion. 
En particulier, les actes délégués et les actes d’exécution envisagés pour la période 2014-2020 
pourraient  inclure  des  dispositions  importantes  concernant  les  exigences  minimales  en 
matière  d’évaluation  ex ante  des  instruments  financiers  innovants;  la  combinaison 
d’instruments financiers innovants et de subventions; l’éligibilité des dépenses; et les ratios 
multiplicateurs à assurer. Ces actes seront essentiels pour assurer la mise en œuvre effective 
et efficace des nouvelles dispositions sur l’utilisation des instruments financiers innovants. 
Les dispositions en matière de reddition de comptes concernant les opérations relatives aux 
instruments  financiers  innovants  seront  également  essentielles  pour  améliorer  la 
transparence  et  seront  utiles  pour  évaluer  si  les  instruments  fonctionnent  de  la  manière 
envisagée initialement.  
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C) Instruments de financement pour l’action extérieure 
Dans le domaine de l’action extérieure, l’UE utilise depuis un certain temps des garanties 
pour les prêts de la BEI au titre des programmes ACP. Les nouveaux mécanismes "mixtes" 
ont  toutefois  ajouté une  dimension supplémentaire  à  l’action  extérieure. Ces mécanismes 
utilisent le financement de l’UE, parfois élargi par des contributions des États membres, et 
sont conçus spécialement pour fournir un soutien financier aux organismes de financement 
du développement et mobiliser ainsi un financement supplémentaire pour les objectifs de 
développement de l’UE.  
Un grand nombre de banques de développement et d’institutions financières internationales 
participent aux mécanismes mixtes pour créer des effets multiplicateurs qui sont souvent 
plus de 20 fois supérieurs à la contribution de l’Union européenne. L’une des faiblesses de 
ces mécanismes est qu’ils ont été mis en place  de manière ad hoc, ce qui signifie que les 
procédures, le suivi et la reddition de comptes les concernant sont souvent différents pour 
des  raisons  qui  ne peuvent  être  justifiées par  des  besoins  opérationnels  dans  les  régions 
cibles. 
Dans  ses  propositions  pour  la  période  2014-2020,  la  Commission  envisage  d’étendre 
l’intervention de ces mécanismes mixtes, en augmentant le financement qui leur est alloué et 
en élargissant leur couverture géographique. Elle propose également la mise en place d’une 
plateforme de l’UE pour la coopération et le développement. 
Si  les  "mécanismes  mixtes"  constituent  des  compléments  intéressants  à  la  politique  de 
développement de l’UE, il convient de veiller à ce que l’utilisation de titres de créance ne 
mène pas à un affaiblissement excessif de l’accent mis sur les pays les plus pauvres ni à un 
accroissement excessif de l’endettement des pays en développement. 
Conclusions et recommandations clés 
Les  ressources  financières  nécessaires  pour  atteindre  les  objectifs  concernant  les  PME, 
l’énergie, le changement climatique, les transports, la croissance et l’emploi, la recherche et 
développement et l’innovation et l’action extérieure dépassent très largement la capacité du 
budget de l’UE avec le financement par subvention traditionnel. Les instruments financiers 
peuvent aider l’Union européenne à atteindre ses multiples objectifs. 
Les  propositions  de  la  Commission  relatives  aux  instruments  financiers  améliorent  le 
fonctionnement des instruments, mais il subsiste un manque de clarté en ce qui concerne la 
future gouvernance de ces instruments et le rôle du Parlement européen. 
L’introduction des plateformes d’instruments de capital et de dette va contribuer à améliorer 
la cohérence entre les différents instruments. Cependant, des efforts supplémentaires doivent 
être fournis à cet égard. Les instruments présentent des structures très différentes en raison 
de leur élaboration ad hoc qui a rendu ces instruments moins transparents. 
Les procédures de budgétisation, la gestion déléguée, l’octroi de financement, les procédures 
de suivi, les modalités d’exécution, l’exposition au risque, l’effet de levier, la reddition de 
comptes  et  la  comptabilité  doivent  être  présentés  d’une  manière  simple  et  totalement 
transparente et dans des formats comparables pour tous les instruments financiers.  
Les  plateformes  d’instruments  de  capital  et  de dette  proposées, y  compris  celles pour  la 
coopération extérieure et le développement, devraient être présidées et gérées par un service 
de  la  Commission,  de  préférence  la  direction  générale  des  Affaires  économiques  et 
financières (DG ECFIN), comme c’est le cas pour le groupe d’experts interservice sur les 
instruments  financiers.  La  plateforme  devrait  aussi  comprendre  un  comité  de  pilotage THE USE OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR EU POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES | 17 
 
auquel participeraient le Conseil et le Parlement européen ainsi que les principales parties 
prenantes. 
Les  plateformes  doivent  fournir  des  orientations  claires  sur  le  suivi  et  l’évaluation  des 
instruments financiers innovants.  
Les instruments financiers innovants doivent suivre la logique du marché, par exemple en 
permettant la réutilisation des remboursements.  
Le caractère  fragmenté du budget accordé aux  instruments financiers innovants dans les 
domaines  politiques  et  les  budgets  régionaux  au  titre  des  Fonds  structurels,  ainsi  que 
l’approche extrêmement prudente d’une exigence de capital de 100 % (ce qui veut dire que le 
budget  peut  toujours  couvrir  une  défaillance  totale  de  tous  les  instruments),  limitent 
considérablement  l’effet  de  levier.  Le  financement  de  garanties  d’instruments  financiers 
innovants devrait être mis en commun dans le fonds le plus vaste possible (y compris pour le 
Fonds de fonds régionaux), même si les parts sont ensuite allouées à l’échelle régionale. Avec 
une exigence de capital plus réaliste (par exemple une couverture des risques prudente de 
50 %), l’effet de levier et l’effet multiplicateur progresseraient de façon spectaculaire.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s objectives and aspirations have increased considerably in the last two 
decades, while its budget in real terms has been shrinking as a percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI) since the 1990s. The introduction of investment mechanisms that combine EU-
budget support with loans mainly by the EIB Group (the European Investment Bank and the 
European Investment Fund), but also from other financial institutions, is seen as one way of 
expanding the reach of the EU budget and increasing its effectiveness. The financial crisis has 
also  increased  the  need  for  innovative  financial  solutions  to  address  a  weakening  credit 
market for public infrastructures, research and development (R&D) and SMEs. While EU-
level  financial  instruments  cannot  fill  the  vacuum  created  by  the  credit  crunch  and  the 
sovereign debt crisis, they can offer specific support in areas with European added value and 
significant long-term returns for growth. The instruments further open up new space for 
collaborating, and stimulate the pooling of resources and development of common standards 
across the EU. The indirect benefits of well-devised mechanisms can also create considerable 
efficiencies of scale.  
The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the 2007–2013 period introduced a 
new high of more than 25 ‘Innovative Financial Instruments’ (InFIs)1, despite being allocated 
only  1.3%  of  the  EU-budget  resources.  Given  their  relative  success,  the  European 
Commission proposes their enlargement, structural reform and consolidation, as well as the 
introduction of ambitious new instruments, in particular the ‘Project Bonds Initiative (PBI)’. 
The proposed extension has sparked both interest and concerns about risk management and 
implications  for  governance,  with  the  European  Parliament  (EP)  Committee  on  Budgets 
requesting a study to analyse the plans for InFIs in the next MFF period – their prospects, 
opportunities  and  risks,  as  well  as    improvements  that  will  probably  be  needed  in  their 
governance structures. 
1.1  Defining innovative financial instruments  
There is some confusion about which interventions are properly classified as ‘innovative’ 
financial  instruments.  In  EU  documents  the  innovative  financial  instruments  are  often 
termed  as  financial  instruments  (FIs).  But  this  is misleading,  a  large number  of  financial 
support mechanisms, including some pure grants or pure EIB loans are presented as FIs. 
However, such instruments cannot be categorised as ‘innovative’ financial instruments, which 
denotes the debt and equity instruments, which arise due to the backing of an EU budget 
grant. This document will use the term innovative consistently with the abbreviation ‘InFI’ to 
avoid  any  confusion.  Unfortunately,  the  term  ‘innovative’  is  also  misleading,  however, 
because not only has the EU used such instruments for SME support and EIB lending for 
some  time,  but  they  are  also  not  novel  to  many  countries’  public  private  partnerships. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how long an instrument can be ‘innovative’! The term causes 
great confusion since any form of financial transfer is really a ‘financial instrument’. It would 
have been smarter to give them another name such as ‘blending instruments’ or just ‘debt 
and equity instruments’. 
InFIs are defined in the proposed Financial Regulation as measures of “financial support 
provided from the budget in order to address one or more specific policy objectives by way 
                                                 
1 It is not easy to coin an acronym for ‘Innovative Financial Instruments': ‘IFI’s would be confused 
with the acronym for International Financial Institutions, while the term ‘financial instruments (FIs)’ 
can be used for any instrument, including grants. In the end, ‘InFI’ was chosen because it is not a 
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of  loans,  guarantees,  equity  or  quasi-equity  investments  or  participations,  or  other  risk-
bearing instruments, possibly combined with grants”2. 
The European Commission’s Communication about EU equity and debt platforms describes 
InFIs as “participations in equity (risk capital) funds, guarantees to local banks’ lending to ... 
final beneficiaries, ... or risk-sharing with financial institutions to boost investment in large 
infrastructure  projects.  (These  instruments)  aim  to  boost  the  real  economy  through 
increasing the access to finance for enterprises and industry producing goods and services”3. 
Financial  instruments  that  differ  from  standalone  grants  are  termed  ‘innovative’.  InFIs 
become  part  of  a  package  linking  different  forms  of  EU-budget  support  with  financial 
products from financial institutions, with their shape and scope determined by the area of 
intervention they address.  
InFIs  can  be  used  in  limited  areas  to  help  overcome  risk  barriers  and  market 
failures/imperfections  by  supporting  projects  that  pursue  EU  policy  objectives,  and  are 
financially  viable  (in  terms  of  revenue  generating  capacity)  but  are  not  (yet)  necessarily 
bankable  (i.e.  they  face  difficulties  in  attracting  finance  from  market  sources).  In  such 
situations, InFIs can complement regulatory interventions and other means of financing.4 
The  EU  budget  currently  supports  InFIs  for  SMEs,  energy  and  transport  infrastructures, 
R&D  and  climate-change  funds,  as  well  as  EU  development  policies  in  neighbouring 
countries, the Western Balkans and developing countries. Around 1.3% of the annual EU 
budget is now implemented through InFIs (on average, less than €500 million per year at the 
EU level). Despite this modest share, the practice of blending grants from the EU budget 
with  loans  from  the  EIB  and  other  financial  institutions  is  estimated  to  have  tripled  the 
impact of EU spending by attracting investment from financial institutions.5 It is likely that 
in coming years, a larger share of the EU budget will be delivered through these instruments. 
1.2  The subject, aim and scope of the study 
This  report  analyses  the  European  Commission  proposals  for  continuing  and  expanding 
InFIs for the 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The study aims to explain 
the  reasons  for  expanding  InFIs  in  the  next  programming  period  and  to  present  the 
governance principles that should guide them. It analyses the Commission proposals to see if 
the reforms actually ensure the most effective use of InFIs. The report should help decision-
makers understand the need for an effective system to ensure transparency and democratic 
control while also preserving the functionality of these instruments.  
The  report  focuses  on  the  substantive  quality  of  the  proposals  and  assesses  the 
appropriateness  of  the  governance  structures  regarding  project  selection,  monitoring, 
transparency, budgetary control and democratic scrutiny. The implicit uncertainties – the 
main  policies  determining  large  funding  fiches  in  the  next  EU  MFF  have  not  yet  been 
finalised  and  discussions  on  the  appropriate  policy  framework  for  InFIs  are  on-going  – 
                                                 
2 EC (2010a) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Union COM(2010)815 of 22.12.2010 Title 
VIII Financial Instruments page 87.  European Commission Q&A – Innovative Financial Instrument. 
http://ec.eureuropa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/innovative_financial_in
struments/index_en.htm 
3 EC (2011b), A framework for the next generation of innovative financial instruments – the EU equity 
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should be noted.  We will not fully evaluate the performance of current InFIs here because 
this was treated in a recent report for the EP (Spence et al. 2012). Instead, this report aims to 
complement the analysis and build upon the findings of the earlier report. 
2.  THE RATIONALE FOR USING INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS   
The Europe 2020 Strategy sets out a number of objectives for the EU that require significant 
levels of investment in terms of trans-European infrastructure, the deployment of low-carbon 
technologies  and  R&D.  While  many  of  these  objectives  could  be  financed  by  the  private 
sector, substantial support is still needed from the public sector and the EU budget. This 
Strategy is being implemented in a context of fiscal austerity and pressure to maintain or 
even reduce the EU budget. A gap is growing between the recognised need to respond to 
core future challenges and the budgetary resources available to meet them. But abandoning 
the Europe 2020 Strategy is not an option. Investments in R&D, low-carbon technologies and 
infrastructure are basic to ensuring future economic growth and EU global competitiveness.  
InFIs can play a role in risky investments that could possibly generate economic returns, or 
whose economic returns are partly public (which makes them less attractive to the private 
sector). For such investments, InFIs can cover part of the associated costs and risks, thereby 
serving as catalysts to make projects bankable from a private perspective.  
InFIs  can  help  increase  the  total  level  of  investments  in  line  with  EU  policy  objectives, 
surpassing by a multiple what would be possible with the EU budget’s fairly limited funds – 
at no (or very limited) risk to the EU budget. These instruments must be well designed and 
properly implemented. In this regard, evaluations of existing instruments already provide a 
number of lessons. In order to work, the instruments need appropriate enabling conditions 
and  complementary  policies.  In  particular,  the  proper  underlying  legal  and  regulatory 
framework is required to stimulate necessary action.  
The EU’s current complex financial regulations were not designed to foster the development 
of flexible and market-oriented tools like InFIs. But the EU financial regulations are currently 
being reviewed: the Commission proposes a new approach to the use of InFIs in the EU, 
including restructuring existing instruments, introducing new instruments and setting up 
equity and debt platforms6 with clear rules for all types of instruments. The new regulatory 
framework  must  ensure  that  these  instruments  are  used  for  the  intended  objectives, 
effectively leveraging investment, with appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanisms in 
place.  
Guaranteeing the level of transparency necessary to ensure accountability and democratic 
scrutiny requires well-designed rules for implementation and budgetary control, as well as 
monitoring  and  reporting  systems.  The  existing  instruments  do  not  allow  for  proper 
scrutiny. While this shortcoming must be rectified, InFIs must also be flexible and resilient – 
responding to market needs and conditions, following sound investment procedures and 
operating at the speed required by private investors. Not only do the instruments have to 
fulfil  the  requirements  of  public  authorities,  they  also  should  be  attractive  to  private 
investors. 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the economic rationale for increasing the use of 
InFIs and the principles for correctly setting up these instruments. This is important because 
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poorly  designed  instruments  will  not  be  used,  and  only  increase  the  gap  between  EU 
objectives and the required financial efforts to achieve them. 
2.1  The economic rationale for using innovative financial instruments 
InFIs’  combined  grants  and  loans  impact  on  the  overall  cost-benefit  balance  of  projects, 
enabling projects and sector investment programmes that could not have been carried out 
otherwise. Grant elements reduce projects’ overall cost and risk, in turn reducing interest 
rates charged to the final beneficiary. For this reason, grant elements are particularly suited 
for projects that have positive economic rates of return and are important for fulfilling EU 
objectives, but cannot attract financiers at normal market rates – either because the projects 
do  not  generate  sufficient  revenue  to  cover  interest  on  a  loan  or,  based  on  market 
perceptions,  the  risks  are  too  high.  Grants  enable  projects  by  operating  as  risk-mitigation 
instruments.  
In  the  case  of  equity  investments,  the  grant  component  of  InFIs,  as  well  as  their  strong 
catalytic  effect  on  potential  co-investors,  serves  to  increase  their  financial  leverage  and 
multiplier effect and attract more funding to projects of high European added value. InFIs 
may also allow grant funds to be pooled from different sources (i.e. EU and national grants) 
and combined with loans from different public and private financial institutions to facilitate 
development  of  large-scale  programmes  that  a  single  financial  institution  might  not  be 
capable  of  financing  and  implementing.  Estimates  indicate  that  the  impacts  have  been 
considerable.  In  the  area  of  infrastructure,  the  total  investment  leveraged  with  EU  grant 
components  have often been more than 20 times greater than the grant element. For riskier 
R&D programmes the amounts leveraged have been 10 times greater than the grant element. 
And yet the amount of additional funding mobilised for SMEs under the Structural Funds 
has been disappointing (ECA 2012)7. This design feature may need reform.  
In addition to creating leverage, the practice of combining resources from different sources 
and  lenders  can  result  in  increased  economies  of  scale  and  thus  improve  effectiveness, 
impact and replicability.   
Unlike the exclusive use of grants, the enhanced use of loans can help increase financial 
discipline and ownership. The fact that beneficiaries have to repay the loans and contribute 
their  own  funds  also  boosts  projects’  financial  sustainability.  In  projects  where  the  risks 
between the public and private sector are properly shared, efficiency has increased (OECD 
2008). The benefits, however, are eroded if the risk distribution is misaligned and the public 
sector takes an excessive share of the risk. Therefore, a sound risk analysis must be used to 
impose a strict limit on the EU-budget liability. 
Equity  investments  and  certain  grants,  if  used as  risk  capital  for  SMEs  for  example,  can 
generate  re-flows  which  in  principle  could  be  redirected  to  new  operations  without  the 
commitment of further resources, reducing EU budgetary costs for the facilities.  
2.2  Aligning innovative financial instruments with EU objectives: Funds under 
shared management 
InFIs  must  be  used  in  limited  areas  to  help  overcome  risk  barriers  and  market 
failures/imperfections by supporting projects that pursue EU policy objectives but are not 
(yet) necessarily bankable (i.e. they have difficulty attracting finance from market sources) 
although they are financially viable in terms of revenue generating capacity, etc. (EC 2011a). 
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While market-driven InFIs must be designed with a certain degree of flexibility they still 
need to be aligned with EU policy objectives to ensure their genuine European added value.  
The Commission proposals for the 2014–2020 EU MFF include improved performance and 
results in terms of the objectives and targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy (EC 2011d). For 
funds under shared management, a Common Strategic Framework (CSF) has been set out to 
translate the Europe 2020 Strategy objectives and targets into concrete investment priorities, 
ensure synergies among the various funds and avoid duplications. The CSF is supposed to 
guide the preparation of the National Partnership Agreements (PAs) and the subsequent 
Operational Programmes (OPs), thereby linking national priorities and investment actions to 
EU objectives (EC 2012c). PAs and OPs can serve as entry points for setting the objectives, 
scope and modalities of InFIs and linking them to EU policy objectives. The Commission 
proposes a number of improvements for the 2014–2020 CSF Funds, some of which could help 
make InFIs more relevant to EU policy objectives. For example, member states and their 
managing authorities could use InFIs to fulfill the thematic objectives of their OPs, thereby 
establishing an indirect link between InFIs and the achievement of EU policy objectives.   
To strengthen the alignment of InFIs with EU policy objectives, an ex-ante assessment and 
criteria that are in line with wider policy objectives are needed, as well as a transparent and 
efficient ex-post reporting system (de Crayencour 2011). Commission proposals for InFIs in 
the CSF funds call for all InFIs to be designed on the basis of an ex-ante assessment to ensure 
that InFIs respond to actual market needs. This assessment is supposed to identify market 
failures  or  sub-optimal  investment  situations  (including  a  financial  gap  analysis)  to  be 
addressed  by  the  instrument;  respective  investment  needs;  possible  private  sector 
participation; and the value added by the particular InFI. However, the ex-ante assessment 
could  also  cover  other  issues  such  as  ‘policy  relevance’.  National  and  regional  OPs  are 
already subject to an ex-ante evaluation procedure which includes checking if the proposed 
OP objective or priority axes are in line with EU policy objectives. It makes sense to require 
similar policy relevance checks in the ex-ante assessment of InFIs under shared management. 
Another way to ensure InFIs’ ex-ante compliance with EU objectives is to have criteria in the 
project selection procedure that favour projects supportive of EU policy objectives. Specific 
project selection criteria linked to the EU’s climate and energy targets were incorporated into 
the design of the ELENA (European Local ENergy Assistance) technical assistance facility 
established under the Intelligent Energy Europe programme. Criteria for the ELENA project 
selection process include (Withana et al. 2011):  
Eligibility of the beneficiary; 
Eligibility of the investment programme; 
Potential bankability of the investment programme; 
Financial and technical capacity to implement an investment programme; 
Contribution to the EU 20–20–20 climate and energy targets; 
Leverage (the cost of the investment must be at least 25 times the 
ELENA contribution); 
European added value, in terms of particular energy policies; 
Use of state-of-the-art technologies. 
One of two specific policy-related criteria indicates that only projects that contribute to the 
EU 20–20–20 climate and energy targets will be supported. The second criterion stipulates 
that ‘European added value’ refers to a project’s contribution to implementing EU policies in 
the field of energy. The experience of ELENA has shown that stringent selection criteria can 
discourage beneficiaries from participating in the financial scheme, meaning that all criteria 
should be balanced to also ensure flexibility and responsiveness to market demands. It can, 
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every  EU  scheme  have  a  natural  learning  curve,  and  that  robust  selection  criteria  are 
important for better targeting financial support to EU policy objectives.    
Aligning InFIs with EU objectives can also be enhanced ex-post. Current proposals for the 
Cohesion Policy call for strengthening reporting, monitoring and evaluation provisions for 
InFIs  in  the  2014–2020  period. Managing  authorities  will  be  obliged  to  submit  a  specific 
report on operations that involve InFIs as an annex to their annual implementation reports to 
the  Commission.  This  is  an  important  improvement  on  existing  reporting  requirements 
(which until 2010 were voluntary). However, it does not require much detail about the actual 
policy  impacts  from  using  InFIs.  Current  proposals  call  for  this  report  to  mainly  cover 
quantitative information about the support paid into an InFI; support paid by the InFI to the 
final recipients; the multiplier effect; and revenues and repayments to the InFI. It should also 
include a section that assesses how InFIs contribute to the OP indicators. The draft Common 
Provisions Regulation on the CSF Funds foresees developing a performance framework that 
links  EU  policy  objectives,  targets,  milestones  and  indicators  for  each  OP  (EC  2011b). 
Linking the annual report on InFIs to OP indicators is a step in the right direction but it 
would be better to have similar provisions for linking reporting requirements to EU policy 
objectives  for  all  InFIs  (including  those  centrally  managed).  The  2012  ECA  report 
recommended that the Commission and member states should agree on a small number of 
measurable, relevant, specific and uniform result indicators for InFIs in order to provide 
more detailed information on their impacts. The production of independent evaluations that 
assess the InFIs policy contributions and help improve the next InFI cycle (after 2020) could 
also be required.  
Another  way  to  improve  alignment  of  InFIs  with  EU  objectives  would  be  to  monitor 
progress  towards  the  achievement  of  policy  objectives  through  European  Commission 
participation in steering, advisory or supervisory bodies. The Commission primarily ensures 
policy control and monitoring of progress towards achievement of EU policy objectives. This 
would give the Commission a broader overview of the progress made in fulfilling policy 
objectives  and  in  overall  instrument  implementation;  give  it  feedback  from  the  final 
beneficiaries about the instrument’s marketing and visibility and the development of new 
products; and gain valuable insights on adjustments to improve the instrument. An ex-post 
advisory/control  function  would  also  be  useful  since  the  Commission  will  not  have  the 
capacity  to  monitor  all  individual  InFIs  investments  ex-ante.  But  given  the  size  of 
investments  for  large-scale  transport,  energy,  and  information  and  communication 
technologies  (ICT)  infrastructures  that  are  financed  with  EU  Project  Bonds,  it  could  be 
argued that the Commission should play a bigger role in supervising the ex-ante appraisal of 
such investments to ensure that they support the achievement of EU policy objectives.   
3.  FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATIVE 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
Before  analysing  the  Commission  proposals  for  InFIs,  the  principles  of  intervention, 
management and governance that should guide these instruments must be identified. These 
principles should be key elements in the proposed platforms for equity and debt. 
European added value 
The  Europe  2020  Strategy stresses  the  need  for  all  EU  interventions  to  add  value  at  the 
European level. InFIs must be justified in terms of the value they add to the EU. It is not clear 
what  this  principle  means  in  practice;  it  differs  according  to  sector,  level  and  context. 
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‘European’ added value. The first is intrinsically linked to the subsidiarity principle: an EU-
level  InFI  should  produce  a  result  that  would  not  have  been  possible  through  national 
instruments alone.  
The primary reason to introduce InFIs at the European level is to cover market gaps that 
could  not  be  efficiently  achieved  at  national  level  (e.g.  because  of  lack  of  sufficient 
diversification), as well as a lack of coordination and/or potential economies of scale. They 
should also outweigh the possible costs of market distortions and not overlap or crowd out 
private  funding  and  national  or  regional  public  funding.  The  benefits  should  have  a 
European dimension, which can be subject to numerous normative economic interpretations: 
achieving local  benefits in line with EU objectives may be considered adequate by some 
analysts but not by others.  
Additionality  
This rule is applicable to EU Structural Funds operations, but should apply to all InFIs in all 
policy  areas  –  although  this  is  rarely mentioned.  EU-level  InFIs  should  not  substitute  or 
crowd out national public or private InFIs, nor should they lead to a reduction of national 
aggregate public expenditure (i.e. become a substitute for public expenditure). InFIs should 
be designed to complement or enhance actions in the public and private sector. 
Addressing sub-optimal investment situations 
This principle is partially linked to that of additionality. The instruments should only be used 
based on a solid analysis that shows a sub-optimal investment situation (see EC 2011, p 5) 
with certain conditions. They should be used for projects that have a positive economic rate 
of return (ERR), but are not attractive to financiers without a grant element from the EU. The 
ERR does not just include the investor revenues but all of the project’s returns. There are two 
instances where InFIs can help projects become bankable: 
The  project  has  a  high  ERR  but  not  a positive internal  rate  of  return  (IRR,  i.e.  the 
private profitability), such as when the investor cannot recover social benefits. In this 
case,  the  grant  element  can  enhance  the  profitability  and  make  the  IRR  positive, 
thereby attracting investors. To some extent, the grant pays for the project’s positive 
externalities. Transaction costs may also be very high – in cross-border infrastructure 
projects, for example. EU assistance can reduce these transaction costs, thus increasing 
the IRR. 
The project may be profitable (have a positive IRR), but not bankable. This could be 
due  to  the  private  sector’s  risk  perceptions,  long  maturities,  or  simply  because  the 
project  is  not  profitable  enough  to  attract  investment  (e.g.  smaller  loans  to  SMEs, 
micro-credit etc.). The grant element in the form of a guarantee or equity can make 
such investments more attractive to financial institutions. 
Great care must be taken to not confuse a sub-optimal investment situation that results from 
market failure or lack of bankability with an investment that has a negative ERR. Even if 
there is political will to complete them, such investments should never be financed with 
InFIs, since the returns will not cover the costs. InFIs need to follow commercial logic. For 
this reason many important policy objectives should be addressed by direct grants, from 
support to basic non-commercial R&D, to social infrastructures.  
In some cases, InFIs can cover part of a project while the rest is covered by more traditional 
EU and other public grants. Such blending can be used when a project component can operate 
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for  specific  infrastructures,  for  example  an  environmental  infrastructure  that  can  partly 
recover the investment through user charges (e.g. combining a dam with a tourist amenity). 
Leverage and multiplier effect 
The InFIs’ objective is to mobilise as much capital as possible for EU objectives by mobilising 
a global investment in the form of equity or debt that is several times greater than the EU-
budget commitment. The Court of Auditors’ latest report on support to SMEs criticised the 
implementation  of  the  ERDF  revolving-  fund  instrument  for  its  very  low  leverage  and 
multiplier effect (European Court of Auditors 2012). 
The most relevant indicator of these funds mobilisation is the multiplier effect that compares 
the  total  equity  and/or  debt  raised  above  the  EU-budget  contribution  to  the  individual 
investment.  Many  EU  documents  mention  leverage  and  multiplier  effects  for  InFIs  and 
grants, but unfortunately, they don’t always mean the same thing. Official definitions of 
what  leverage  and  multiplier  effects  mean  for  InFIs  are  explained  below.  For  more 
information, the 2012 Spence report gives a more detailed representation, along with the 
definition formulas.  
The  performance  of  InFIs  is  measured  by  their  ability  to  raise  additional  funding.  The 
various  levels  of  funding  that  can  be  mobilised  are  defined  differently.8  There  are  three 
funding components: 
An EU-budget element in the form of grants or risk guarantees from the EU budget; 
Equity  and  risk  funding  from  a  public  financial  institution  directly  linked  to  the 
instrument (generally the EIB and the EIF); 
Other funding: public grants and other equity or debt funding by other public and 
private financial institutions, or funds raised in capital markets. 
Three measures indicate an instrument’s financial mobilisation: 
Instrument  leverage  (IL):  The  amount  of  funding  the  EU-budget  contribution  has 
mobilised from a financial institution that is linked to the instrument (e.g. the EIB) in 
relation to the EU-budget contribution. For example, if the EIB offers guarantees and 
loans worth €1 billion for an EU grant of €100 million, the IL is 10 (funding mobilised 
by the instrument/EU budget contribution). 
In the case of an EIF ‘first- loss guarantee’, the EU budget is used to cover the expected 
loss (subject to a ceiling and conditional on the achievement of a minimum portfolio 
volume) that is associated with the creation of a new financing portfolio for SMEs. For 
example, if the EIF signs a guarantee for a new portfolio of loans of €100 million, with a 
guaranteed amount of €50 million and a guarantee cap of  €5 million, the leverage 
would be the guaranteed volume divided by the maximum EIF exposure from the 
guarantee, that is, 10x (50 million / 5 million). The current average leverage under the 
SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG) portfolio is currently about 16x. 
Project leverage (PL): This represents the amount of additional funding the instrument 
has attracted. It compares the total instrument leverage (the EIB loan generated) to the 
grand  total  of  funding  that  was  raised  (including  other  public  or  private  financial 
institutions, other public grants, etc.). This means that if a project’s total funding is €3 
billion and the instrument leverage €1 billion we have €3 billion/€1 billion, or three. 
For equity fund investments, the leverage is the amount of third party investor money 
catalysed by the EIF investment in equity funds (i.e. total fund size/the EIF stake). On 
average, under the GIF the leverage amounts to about 5x at fund level.  
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Multiplier effect: The most widely used and most often misunderstood measure is the 
multiplier effect (ME), which compares all funding to the EU-budget element. In the 
case above with a €3 billion PL, €1 billion IL and a grant of €100m, it would be €3 
billion/€100 million, or a multiplier of 30. 
For EIF equity funds, if the EIF invests €20 million into an equity fund with a total size of 
€100  million  (including  third  party  investments),  which  in  turn  invests  the  total  fund  in 
SMEs, catalysing further financing for each portfolio company for €300 million on aggregate 
from other investors, the multiplier would be 20x (400 million/20 million). 
It  is  important  to  note  that  having  a  large  leverage  and  multiplier  effect  does  not 
automatically  mean  that  the  instrument  reaches  a  high  level  of  additionality.  These 
calculations do not show whether or not the other resources that are attracted would have 
been used in the absence of the instrument and/or if the EU budget and the EIB/EIF are 
substituting  for  existing  funding.  The  multiplier  also  does  not  take  into  account  the 
investment’s catalytic role. For instance, a relatively large stake taken by the EIF in an equity 
fund may provide the signalling effect used by other investors to invest in the fund so that 
the EIF investment catalyses overall funding – even though its catalytic role is not reflected 
in the fairly small leverage/multiplier numbers. Inversely, if the EIF takes a relatively small 
stake in a large equity fund that was likely to have developed without any EIF participation, 
then  the  leverage  and  multiplier  numbers  will  be  very  high,  although  the  true  catalytic 
nature/added  value  of  the  EIF  investment  might  be  very  low.  Any  methodology  for 
calculating the multiplier should consider these aspects, including the non-financial impacts. 
The multiplier effect is just one element of the overall measure of the impact of any given 
investment; more analysis is necessary to determine the instrument’s full impact. 
Budgetary stability and risk exposure 
The current Financial Regulation (Article 14) requires the EU budget to be balanced and 
subjects it to a strict expenditure ceiling. These provisions are unlikely to change with the 
current  review  of  the  financial  regulations.  This  means  that  even  if  the  EU  budget  can 
theoretically cover risks beyond the budget allocations, the liability in a single year could 
never be higher than the EU-budget maximum ceiling of 1.23 % of GNI.  
For InFIs, there is no financial risk above the level of funding allocated to the instrument 
because the programme is designed to cap the EU-budget risk. Liabilities generated by the 
instruments are currently limited to the EU-budget contribution.  
EU-budget guarantees are generally not free (i.e. they are priced), thus offering revenues that 
help make the instrument more stable and efficient. The flows can be used to refinance the 
required  risk  capital.  This  means  that  loan  interest  rates  not  only  cover  the  financial 
institutions’ operational costs, but can also generate revenue that provides returns to the 
instrument, generating funding for new operations. The main source of reflows now comes 
from SME equity funds; The use of reflows to refinance the instruments is not allowed in 
other InFIs. The generation of reflows and their reuse in new operations still needs to be 
clarified and codified. 
Current capping provisions are based on an excessively stringent interpretation of risk that 
impacts on the final leverage and multiplier effect. Risk for the EU budget is interpreted as 
strictly as possible, equating the maximum annual liability risk for the EU budget with the 
size  of  the  EU  guarantees.  This  protects  EU  liabilities  that  would  result  from  the 
simultaneous default of all projects, necessitating a 100% capital requirement, which is far 
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– even conservative – would considerably enhance the leverage and multiplier effect of the 
instruments. 
Another point worth mentioning is that EU-budget risks decline in proportion to the size of 
the instrument and the variety of the portfolio (that increase the risk spread). To reduce 
default risks, instruments should aim to pool funding into the largest equity and guarantee 
fund. In addition, a less stringent capital requirement would create much greater impact on 
the leverage and multiplier effect of such pooling. 
Instruments  can  allow  for  risk  to  be  shared  with  entrusted  entities  that  would  not  lend 
without EU-budget assistance – either because of the level of risk or because of the bank’s 
capital adequacy rules. 
Transparency 
The procedures for InFIs lack coherence and transparency. Although reporting does exist, 
the formats, reporting times and level of detail have not inconsistent. The fact that InFIs are 
controlled  by  different  DGs  has  resulted  in  unnecessary  variations  in  their  set-up, 
management,  terminology  and  reporting.  This  report’s  authors  even  found  that  one 
instrument of external action used a different measure of leverage for reporting. The lack of a 
central body responsible for reporting has exacerbated this opacity.  
The  procedures  for  budgeting,  delegated  management,  award  funding,  monitoring 
processes, implementation rules, risk exposure, leverage, reporting and accounting should 
be  presented  in  a  simple  and  fully  transparent  manner  in  a  comparable  format  for  all 
instruments.  Reporting  now  only  gives  a  partial  picture  of  the  instrument’s  parameters 
which  are:  leverage  and  multiplier  effect,  financial  investors,  the  project’s  time  horizon, 
investment conditions, level and management of revenues and the project’s risk exposure. 
Simple, consistent and relevant information must be transparently presented. Care must be 
taken to appropriately balance reporting requirements, the usefulness of their information, 
and the administrative burden they impose on financial institutions, the Commission and 
beneficiaries. 
The authors of this report conclude that the most appropriate body to oversee this process 
and  ensure  consistency  would  be  the  European  Commission’s  Directorate  General  for 
Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (DG  ECFIN).  Coherence  should  be  ensured  through  the 
equity and debt platforms, chaired by the DG ECFIN in the form of the existing Financial 
Instruments Inter-services Expert Group (FIEG). This should become the base of the equity 
and debt platform, as well as for the proposed Platform for Cooperation and Development, 
with  a  steering  committee  that  includes  representatives  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council, and perhaps other key external stakeholders. It should also set up working groups 
with  the  financial  institutions  that  are  participating  in  the  instruments.  The  policy 
formulation, objectives, selection criteria for the instruments, day-to-day management and 
reporting should remain the responsibility of the relevant DGs and entrusted entities, such 
as  the  EIB.  The  DG  ECFIN  should  assure  a  centrally  located  consolidated  information 
service. 
Harmonisation and simplification 
All InFIs should follow a common set of rules, enshrined in legislative or delegated acts. 
Integration and coherence between innovative financial instruments 
Today’s InFIs were developed ad hoc and are poorly coordinated, with some interventions 
overlapping  –  in  particular,  support  to  SMEs.  The  European  Commission  is  developing 28 | NÚÑEZ FERRER, VOLKERY, WITHANA & MEDAROVA-BERGSTROM 
 
proposals to better integrate the instruments. Whenever possible, instruments targeting the 
same policy areas and providing similar products should be combined. Plans to create equity 
and debt platforms aim at ensuring coherent and well-designed instruments. 
Flexibility in a changing environment 
InFIs have to be able to take different forms depending on the needs of the area of action. 
Financial budget support can take the following InFI forms: 
Support to technical assistance and studies 
Direct investment grants 
Conditionality / performance-related grants 
Interest rate subsidies 
Loan guarantees  
Credit enhancement – first-loss piece 
Risk capital 
Equity and debt financing 
Some of these forms of support that are not yet being used are far from the rigid grant-only 
mechanism traditionally found in the EU budget. Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of 
the link between the EU budget, financial institutions and beneficiaries to indicate how these 
instruments are used.  
In the case of technical assistance and direct investment grants - Technical assistance to 
prepare and accompany a project is offered to the beneficiary. Direct investment grants 
can cover parts of a project that financiers cannot finance, either because they do not 
generate revenue or they are too risky. Such assistance reduces costs and risks and 
triggers support from financial institutions. 
Interest rate subsidies - Accredited financial institutions can benefit from a number of 
EU-budget  instruments.  In  external  action,  the  EU  budget  can  cover  costs  for  the 
institutions, allowing them to offer beneficiaries loans with lower interest rates. Interest 
rate  subsidies  (IRS)  are,  however,  only  appropriate  in  countries  facing  debt-
sustainability issues (which tend to be developing countries); they are mostly used by 
the external action budget. 
Loan guarantees (such as a first-loss piece) cover part of the unexpected losses or the 
default of a project. They reduce risks and trigger loans with lower interest rates to 
beneficiaries, and are mainly used to fund transport and innovation. They also are the 
key element of the proposed Project Bonds Initiative. 
Risk capital offers funds for financial institutions to lend or invest in risky investments 
that they otherwise would not support. 
Equity and debt are funds used mostly to finance SMEs and micro-enterprises through 
intermediary institutions. In some cases, the EIB manages and lends funds directly to 
beneficiaries. The funds can be placed in a holding fund, either from the budget or 
through the EIB. The holding fund is a national entity that manages funds and allocates 
them  to  intermediary  financial  institutions.  The  EU  budget  may  also  directly  offer 
funds to national financial institutions.  
Where  an  instrument  covers  many  different  areas  of  intervention,  as  is  the  case  of 
development aid, the entrusted financial institution should choose the best instrument and 
the necessary level of support, based on a watertight rationale.  
There is some resistance to allowing the EU budget to move into such forms of support. This 
comes from a fear that the instruments create risk for the budget, which is as unjustified as 
the  belief  that  grants  are  not  risky,  either.  In  fact,  the  level  of  risk  depends  on  the THE USE OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR EU POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES | 29 
 
implementation framework that is in place, which includes the project selection process and 
the  equity and  debt  platforms.  The  legal  base  for  InFIs should  be  sufficiently  flexible  to 
adjust operations and programmes to changing market conditions. 
Figure 1. Understanding different forms of innovative financial instruments 
 
Delegation 
InFIs  must  be  delivered  through  specialised  financial  institutions  with  the  capacity  and 
experience  to  manage  such  instruments.  Rules  limiting  budgetary  liability,  setting  clear 
eligibility  rules  and  requiring  the  delegated  financial  institutions  to  apply  sound 
management  and  control  procedures  can  ensure  the  efficient  implementation  of  InFIs. 
Reporting  and  monitoring,  along  with  interim  evaluations,  will  allow  the  Council,  the 
European Parliament and the European Commission to intervene to redirect and improve 
the instruments as they are being implemented. Policy prioritisation, budgetary control and 
democratic scrutiny are important issues, but should not jeopardise the functionality of the 
instruments.  The  European  Commission should  not  require project-by-project  transaction 
approvals – with the possible exception of specific large projects.9 
InFI management and implementation should be fully delegated to the entrusted entity. For 
centrally or joint managed funds (i.e. those not under shared management with member 
states)  the  entrusted  entity most  frequently  will  be  the  EIB,  although  other  international 
                                                 
9 Requiring the Commission to grant ex-ante project approval would create an unnecessary burden 
whereas the entrusted entities are chosen for their ability and expertise in the area of intervention and 
are  better  placed  to  take  such  decisions.  Ex-ante  approval  by  the  Commission  would  also  not 
guarantee better management of a selection procedure: it could instead create perverse incentives by 
blurring responsibilities and allowing the entrusted entity or fund manager to disclaim responsibility 
for specific projects that had been ‘rubberstamped’ by the Commission.  30 | NÚÑEZ FERRER, VOLKERY, WITHANA & MEDAROVA-BERGSTROM 
 
financial  institutions  (IFIs)  and  bilateral  public  financial  institutions  where  at  least  one 
member  state  is  a  shareholder  may  also  be  eligible10,  provided  they  follow  procedures 
satisfying  EU-budget  control  standards  and  their  progress  is  well  monitored.  Specialised 
investment vehicles can also be set up under national laws to manage funds. It is clear that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  EIB,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  financial  institutions  being 
accountable to the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament, rather than to 
national courts of auditors and national parliaments. In such cases, the EU should ensure 
that the standards propose a uniform level of control across all institutions in EU member 
states.  
The rules of delegation will have to define the rules about financial institutions’ management 
fees  and  the  pricing  of  the  instruments.  Several  financial  institutions  interviewed  by  the 
authors inferred that there are problems with the fee structure, which seems to have been 
over-engineered  and  inconsistent.  There  are  different  rules  for  different  facilities  –  for 
reasons that do not appear to be based on objective criteria. This system needs review. 
Management of reflows 
At  the  moment,  only  SME  InFIs  in  the  Structural  Funds  can  reinvest  revenues  and 
repayments generated by the instruments in order to reuse them during the programming 
period. This principle has been successfully used in financial instruments of the European 
Development  Fund  budget  (since  the  Ninth  EDF),  but  is  not  allowed  in  other  areas  –  a 
reflection of some member states’ resistance to allowing the reuse of reflows.   
Reflows can be used to generate a self-financing long-term investment cycle. Management of 
InFIs and reflows should be based on the most efficient operating methods. Impeding reuse 
of  reflows  in  the  programme  limits  the  instruments’  impact  and  efficiency.  Programmes 
should also be permitted to continually use reflows, even from one programming period to 
the  next.  Restrictions  are not  cost  efficient  and prevent  long-term  sustainable  investment 
flows in strategic EU activities. EU-budget support can be priced according to the objectives, 
thus generating revenue from successful projects that in turn are reinvested in those projects 
or to balance losses from riskier (but high European Value Added) projects. Pricing levels 
have to be decided with due care, however, as those are a cost which in turn affects the 
instrument’s leverage and multiplier.  
Awareness and visibility 
EU-level InFIs must be clearly identifiable and accessible for beneficiaries, and visible to the 
general  public.  Accordingly,  rules  for  entrusted  entities,  national  authorities  and 
intermediary bodies need to be specified to ensure awareness of InFIs and visibility of EU 
instruments. 
3.1  The equity and debt platforms 
The equity and debt platform structures will provide a standardised set of common rules 
and  principles  to  ensure  effective  EU  oversight  of  the  various  InFIs11.  The  governance 
principles to be followed in designing and implementing these instruments are listed above. 
The platforms will not have their own budget lines, but rather will be financed by allocations 
from  different  budget  lines.  For  InFIs  under  shared  management,  the  rules  from  the 
                                                 
10 The exact wording of the new financial regulation about which institutions can be entrusted to 
manage the facilities is unclear.  
11 Platforms will be created for internal policies, for the moment it is not clear if the platforms will also 
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platforms  will  merely  be  presenting  guidelines  for  best  practice.  The  equity  and  debt 
platforms  must  in  addition  to  implementation  rules,  develop  procedures  including  for 
budgetary control and reporting.  
To  ensure  coordination  and  coherence,  the  platforms  should  be  governed  by  a  steering 
committee  composed  of  the  Directorate  Generals  (DGs)  involved,  the  entrusted  financial 
institutions and representatives of the Council and the European Parliament. The DG ECFIN 
would be the most ideal DG to chair the steering committee, with the lead DGs chairing 
specific policy areas.  
This  is  based  on  a  similar  structure  that  already  exists  in  the  form  of  the  Financial 
Instruments  Inter-services  Expert  Group  (FIEG)  that  was  created  to  provide  permanent 
internal  guidance  and  advice  to  DGs  throughout  the  lifetime  of  InFIs  by  the  Secretary 
General  and  the  DG-ECFIN  Director  General  in  January  2012. It  includes  the  Secretariat 
General, DG ECFIN, DG BUDG, DG COMP and the Legal Service, and is chaired by the DG 
ECFIN. The FIEG aims to foster coherent instrument design and ensure conformity with 
common rules, principles and guidelines. Other DGs are invited to attend the FIEG meetings 
as required for the area of competence.  
The FIEG offers an interesting starting point for the equity and debt platforms because it 
allows a specialised Commission service to oversee all InFIs, thereby increasing clarity and 
coordination. It is also the light and flexible structure needed for instruments that must be 
able to adapt to rapidly changing market conditions. The aims of the FIEG are:  
To  achieve  coherence  and  consistency  of  all  InFIs  and  avoid  overlaps  between 
instruments; 
To ensure the existence of an appropriate implementation framework, in compliance 
with the regulations and standards, and reflecting sound financial management and 
best market practice; 
To ensure that individual financial instruments efficiently pursue their objectives in 
line with the Europe 2020 Strategy; 
To monitor the performance of monitoring and evaluation systems; 
To ensure consistency in reporting (and thus transparency); 
To  ensure  an  appropriate  balance  between  administrative  requirements  and  the 
specificities of flexibility, functionality and geography needed for the instruments; 
To  provide  clear  and  consistent  rules  for  framework  agreements  with  the  EIB,  the 
EBRD  and  other  international  and  national  financial  institutions  involved  in 
implementation. 
The FIEG is an advisory group for the Commission services, with a structure that can be 
adapted  to  fulfil  the  needs  of  the  debt  and  equity  platform  as  well  as  the  platform  for 
blending instruments in external action. Although the FIEG appears to cover all aspects that 
the debt and equity platforms need to address, it is actually a closed group of Commission 
representatives without external input. A debt and equity platform, however, needs a formal 
link to the European Parliament and the Council Secretariat, as well a clear link to technical 
groups including the financial institutions. Simple reporting does not suffice.  
The debt and equity platform could have two levels: a steering group with representatives of 
the European Parliament and the Council that meets once or twice a year to discuss policy 
issues  and  review  the  coherency  of  the  instruments  with  their  stated  objectives;  and  a 
separate  operational financiers  group  with  representatives  of  the  financial  institutions.  The 
FIEG could then take charge of the implementation, monitoring and reporting on InFIs. 32 | NÚÑEZ FERRER, VOLKERY, WITHANA & MEDAROVA-BERGSTROM 
 
4.  INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE 2014–2020 PERIOD 
There are currently 25 InFIs: 10 internal instruments managed by the European Commission 
either  centrally  or  jointly  with  a  financial  institution,  three  instruments  under  shared 
management  (thus  mainly  under  the  control  of  national  authorities)  and  13  external 
instruments. Annex 1 presents a detailed description of these instruments. Table 1 lists the 
instruments divided into the three groups.  
Table 1. Innovative Financial Instruments in the 2007–2013 programming period 
Internal 
Central and 
Joint management 
Internal 
Shared management 
External 
CIP GIF 
High Growth and Innovative 
SME Facility 
JEREMIE 
Joint European Resources for 
Micro to Medium Enterprises 
WBIF 
Western Balkans Investment 
Framework 
CIP SMEG07 
SME Guarantee Facility 
JESSICA 
Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investment in City 
Areas 
NIF 
Neighbourhood Investment 
Facility 
RSFF 
Risk-Sharing Finance Facility 
JASPERS 
Joint Assistance to Support 
Projects in European Regions 
EU-A ITF 
EU-Africa Infrastructure  
Trust Fund 
LGTT 
Loan Guarantee Instrument for 
Trans-European Network 
Transport Projects 
   
ACP Investment Facility 
 
Marguerite Fund 
The 2020 European Fund for 
Energy, Climate Change  
and Infrastructure 
  GEEREF 
Global Energy Efficiency  
and Renewable Energy Fund 
EPMF 
European Progress 
Microfinance Facility 
  EFSE 
European Fund  
for Southeast Europe 
TTP 
Technology Transfer  
Pilot Project 
  GGF 
Green for Growth Fund 
JASMINE 
Joint Action to Support 
Microfinance Institutions  
in Europe 
  LAIF 
Latin America  
Investment Facility 
ELENA 
European Local Energy 
Assistance 
  IFCA 
Investment Facility  
for Central Asia 
EEEF 
European Energy Efficiency 
Fund 
  AIF 
Asia Investment Facility  
(New, end 2011) 
    CIF 
Caribbean Investment Facility 
(New, 2012) 
    IFP 
Investment Facility for the 
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The European Commission proposes restructuring and consolidating these instruments in 
the 2014–2020 period, and expanding their scope and creating new instruments such as the 
Project Bonds Initiative. Restructuring will address inefficiencies revealed in evaluations of 
current  instruments,  including  those  that  result  from  the  lack  of  coherence  between 
instruments creating divergences and overlaps. The Commission is developing a proposal to 
restructure  internal-policy  InFis  that  it  manages  to  make  them  more  coherent  and  to 
streamline  procedures  using  the  debt  and  equity  platforms  (Figure  2).  Building  on 
experience  gained  during  the  2007–2013  period  and  introducing  a  number  of  novelties, 
Commission proposals for the 2014–2020 EU Structural and Cohesion Funds expand and 
strengthen  the  use  of InFIs  under  shared  management.  No major  restructuring  has  been 
proposed for external policies and instruments under shared management, but many policy 
improvements have been proposed. This is further discussed in following chapters.  
Figure 2. New InFIs in the 2014–2020 MFF and the Europe 2020 Strategy 
 
Source: DG ECFIN (2011), Financial instruments in the MFF 2014–2020, presentation at the ‘Exploring 
the potential of new financial instruments for climate change’ workshop, Brussels, 11.10.2011. 
As indicated in Figure 2, the Commission has proposed a new more streamlined structure 
with six instruments for InFIs managed by the Commission in internal policies. These six 
instruments do not cover all existing and future instruments but only those directly related 
to main EU-budget policies, such as the Horizon 2020 or the Cohesion Policy. It also does not 
include specialised funds that are not part of those policies, such as the EEEF (European 
Energy Efficiency Fund) or ‘Marguerite’ Fund (the 2020 European Fund for Climate Change 
and Infrastructure). The new structure aims to reduce overlaps and simplify the architecture, 
thus making them potentially more transparent to beneficiaries. What this change may mean 
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Figure 3. InFIs managed by the European Commission (central and joint management): Comparisons 
between current instruments and proposals  
 
Source: Based on interviews with the European Commission. 
The  European  Commission  is  also  setting  up  better  coordination  structures  in  areas  of 
external action; however, this is mainly taking place in relation to instruments under the DG-
DEVCO control. Collaboration with the DG Enlargement and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) still needs to be strengthened to improve coherence with their InFIs. This 
may indicate a role involving the FIEG regarding external InFIs. 
An important reform across the instruments relates to combining grants and INFIs. Some 
current  rules  prevent  beneficiaries  combining  two  forms  of  EU  assistance  for  the  same 
project, for example combining an SME grant support with an EU-backed loan. This may 
make sense in terms of combining two grants, but not when combining grants with loans 
from  InFIs.  The  Commission  proposals  eliminate  the  provision  that  a  project  cannot  be 
financed  by  more  than  one  source  and  set  out  rules  that  enable  combining  financial 
instruments with other forms of support, in particular, grants.  
The  subsections  below  review  the  main  proposals  for  InFIs  in  the  2014–2020  period  and 
assess the extent to which these proposals are in line with certain governance principles 
discussed  in  Chapter  2,  namely  European  added  value,  additionality,  sub-optimal 
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effects, budgetary stability and risk, visibility and awareness, and transparency. The InFIs 
examined are: 
Research: the RSFF 
Competitiveness: SME assistance 
Cohesion Policy: proposals for InFIs under shared management  
Transport: the LGTT and the Project Bonds Initiative 
External action: the loan and grant ‘blending facilities’ 
The purpose of this chapter is not to present a full and detailed evaluation of the proposed 
InFIs, but rather to pinpoint areas that are unclear or will need special attention in the next 
MFF. 
4.1  The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility 
It is well documented that the European Union’s share of GNI that is invested in R&D is 
below the level of investment in the US and Japan. The main cause of this weakness is the 
low contribution by the private sector (Uppenberg 2009). An important gap in financing has 
been identified at the development stages of demonstration and deployment. While basic 
research in Europe is covered by grants at levels similar to those in the US and Japan, at the 
critical stages of testing and deployment funding evaporates. The gap between R&D results 
and deployment is often referred to as the ‘valley of death’ or the ‘technology death-risk 
area’ (Núñez Ferrer et al. 2011). 
This ‘technology death-risk area’ is described in Figure 4. It is a zone that does not attract 
investors for a number of reasons, such rising costs and long maturity periods with high 
uncertainty. For technologies that have a positive economic rate of return12 there is adequate 
reason for the public sector to intervene with bridge capital when such finance gaps appear. 
Public support can assist in financing and increase the bankability of projects by reducing 
risks and associated interest rate costs. 
Figure 4. Technology cycle and financial needs 
 
Source: Nunez Ferrer et al. (2011), SET-Plan – From Concept to Successful Implementation’, CEPS Task 
Force Report, May 2011, p. 24. 
                                                 
12 The economic rate of return (ERR) includes benefits to society that are not captured by the investor. 
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In an initiative to promote innovation and technology development, in 2007 the European 
Commission launched the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) in collaboration with the EIB. 
This  debt-based  InFI  is  part  of  the  Seventh  Framework  Programme  for  Research  and 
Technological Development (FP7). The EIB and the European Commission each provided 
€500 million as a capital cushion to cover any risks incurred by projects for the period 2007–
2010, and they will each provide another €500 million for 2011 to 2013. With an estimated 
conservative risk of default of 20%, the risk guarantee of €1 billion jointly provided by the EC 
and the EIB could raise investment sums between €8 to €24 billion in three years (a multiplier 
effect of 16 to 48). The RSFF has shown convincing results: by the first quarter of 2012, loans 
worth €9.6 billion had been signed, and almost €5 billion disbursed (EIB 2012).   
Based on an independent Expert Group’s interim evaluation of the RSFF that was published 
by the EIB (2010a), the RSFF successfully assisted large companies and mid caps, but did not 
sufficiently  support  SMEs.  The  Expert  Group  recommended  that  the  RSFF  improve  its 
specific focus on SMEs. For this reason, specific support for SMEs was introduced for the 
period 2012–13, the Risk-Sharing Instrument (RSI) for highly innovative SMEs and small mid 
caps, in collaboration with the European Investment Fund (EIF), which is implementing it. 
4.1.1  Proposals for the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility in the 2014–2020 period 
The Horizon 2020 programme will continue to finance the Risk-Sharing Financing Facility 
(RSFF), greatly increasing its size and reach. The European Commission proposes increasing 
the EU-budget contribution for financial instruments in research to €3.768 million to create a 
very large multiplier effect. The amount is not broken down into what the RSFF follow-up 
will receive and the Research, equity funds for Development and Innovation (RDI) . Horizon 
2020 will also assist SMEs by expanding the Risk-Sharing Instrument and integrating the 
High Growth and Innovative SME Facility (GIF) for seed, start-ups and early-stage SMEs 
that are presently in the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP). 
The potential leverage is very high, but the size will also depend on the EIB’s contribution to 
the capital cushion and the way it is managed. The multiplier effect could generate over €100 
billion in investment in R&D over the period of the MFF. This represents approximately 10% 
of the gap in R&D investment to the 3% target level in the Europe 2020 strategy. The level of 
funding  that  is  mobilised  will  depend  on  many  factors,  such  as  the  level  of  additional 
funding that the RSFF is able to attract from other sources, since the rules now allow this 
fund to be topped up with national contributions to increase the leverage and multiplier 
effect. The RSFF now has a project-by-project approach that is handled directly through the 
EIB,  but  in  the  future  the RSFF  will  take  a  portfolio  approach  that  will  be  delivered  by 
partner banks.  
The new risk-sharing model that has already been implemented for the RSFF also aims to 
change how risks are distributed between the EU budget and other institutions (mainly the 
EIB and the EIF). While the risk used to be shared on the same footing, in the future it will be 
based on a first-loss piece approach, in which the EU budget takes the first losses – up to 95% 
of the guaranteed amount. The residual 5% risk guarantee will be borne by the EIB. This can 
enhance the lending capacity of the financial institutions or reduce the level of risk interests 
they require, thereby increasing the multiplier effect.  
Overlaps  between  the  RSFF  support  for  SMEs  (RSI)  and  the  support  offered  by  the 
Competitiveness  and  Innovation  Programme  (CIP)  will  be  addressed  by  improving 
instrument  coordination  and  merging  SME  support  for  start-ups  in  the  CIP  (the  future 
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A final necessary reform is to allow the facility to reuse reflows from repayments. The fact 
that this is not allowed reduces the instrument’s potential. 
Table 2. The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility Assessment 
Principles  Assessment of the RSFF 
European Added 
Value 
Innovation  is  essential  for  the  European  Union’s  long-term  economic 
growth, and according to economic theory, R&D is one of the most suitable 
areas for European-level investment. This allows for pooling resources and 
improves coordination across the EU, avoiding duplication and generating 
economies of scale. It also allows for large collaborative projects to emerge 
which no single member state could finance alone.  
The RSFF started when investment in R&D was hit by the financial crisis, 
thus providing a welcome boost for one of the EU’s highest priority areas. 
Additionality  The RSFF is supposed to finance innovative high-risk investments with a 
high ERR – where financial institutions would not invest. When this is the 
case,  additionality  is  preserved.  The  RSFF  only  contributes  to  part  of  a 
project’s  financing  and  must  be  complemented  by  additional  sources.  It 
does not have a mechanism to identify a project’s ability to attract other 
capital and a project’s additionality may be questioned, but discrimination 
on these grounds is not feasible in project selection. In any case, the Expert 
Group’s evaluation of the RSFF found no evidence that it crowds out other 
financial sources. Instead, it discovered complementarity.13  
It is impractical to ensure ex-ante additionality for projects, and refuse or 
accept  demands  for  financing  based  on  these  criteria.  There  is  a  well-
documented  lack  of  finance  for  innovative  companies,  and  serious  due 
diligence for RSFF projects guarantees quite a high level of additionality. 
Demand for R&D funding is much higher than the market provision. 
Addressing sub-
optimal investment  
The RSFF is designed to finance projects with high ERRs that do not attract 
funding due to market failures.  
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
The RSFF has a very impressive multiplier effect, with the total amount of 
finance that is mobilised by all sources more than 30 times higher than the 
EU- budget contribution. The instrument leverage (IL) is over 12 and the 
project leverage (PL) is over three. The total multiplier effect is considerable 
and may exceed €100 billion – or even more if other grant resources are 
pooled  into a  kind  of  ‘trust  fund’, or other  institutions  offer  shared risk 
capital. Changing the risk-sharing mechanism to a portfolio first-loss piece 
will affect the RSFF’s leverage and multiplier effect positively. 
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
The risk guarantee offered will be strictly capped, thus eliminating a risk to 
the EU budget. Today the risk-sharing capital is based on an approach in 
which risks are shared equally. This is supposed to change to a first-loss 
approach,  where  the  EU  budget  takes  the  first  loss  up  to  95%  of  the 
guaranteed level. Guarantees by other institutions such as the EIB will only 
be called upon once 95% of the guaranteed amount has been crossed, and 
then for only 5%. This approach enhances the lending capacity of the EIB 
and other risk-sharing institutions. 
 
 
                                                 
13 EC (2010c), Interim Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme, Report of the Expert Group, 
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Principles  Assessment of the RSFF 
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
The  EIB  is  entrusted with  managing  EU  funds,  from  project  selection  to 
financial  management.  A steering  committee  consisting  of  four members 
each  from  the  European  Commission  and  the  EIB  will  supervise  the 
implementation. Although the RSFF has performed correctly and efficiently, 
the EIB’s evaluation published in 2010 indicates uptake difficulties in some 
countries.  
The European Commission and the EIB are not permitted to reuse reflows 
from the repayment of the loans in the facility, which serves to reduce the 
strength and efficiency of the RSFF. 
Visibility and 
awareness 
The level of visibility and awareness of the RSFF has been generally positive 
as indicated by the rapid uptake of the funding.  
Transparency  The EIB reports on progress and also makes ex-post evaluations of selected 
investments that are published on the EIB website. It is difficult to monitor 
results  given  the  increasing  number  of  operations  and  because  most 
impacts become obvious sometime long after the period of loan operations 
has  ended.  The  reporting  requirements  and  the  administrative  burden 
imposed on financial institutions, the Commission and beneficiaries must 
be carefully balanced. 
 
4.2  SME assistance under CIP and in the future under COSME 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) has two InFIs operating as part of the 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Programme (EIP): the High Growth and Innovative SME 
Facility (GIF) and the SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG).  
The GIF is managed by the EIF, which invests in venture capital funds to increase the level of 
equity for innovative SMEs in the early stages (GIF1) and in the expansion phase (GIF2).  
The SMEG Facility is also managed by the EIF and provides guarantees that partially cover 
SME loan portfolios by financial institutions. There are four ‘windows’ or business lines: 
Loan Guarantees: These cover debt finance portfolios that target SMEs.  
Micro-Credit  Guarantees:  These  cover  portfolios  of  credits  to  micro-enterprises 
through financial institutions, especially start-ups. 
Equity  Guarantees:  These  cover  portfolios  of  investments  in  SMEs  in  the seed  and 
start-up phases; ‘Quasi Equity Guarantees’ are available. It also provides quasi equity 
for mezzanine financing. 
Securisation:  These  are  guarantees  for  financial  institutions  to  mobilise  more  debt 
financing for SMEs. 
These programmes started in 2007; the investment periods run until the end of 2012, while 
the actual transactions will continue many years beyond 2012 (until 2026 for GIF). Because 
the programme is not old, it is difficult to evaluate the impact at this stage.  
The  GIF  and  the  SMEG  have  been  relatively  successful,  with  high  demand  for  the 
instruments.14 Surveys indicate that two-thirds of the GIF beneficiaries consider that without 
                                                 
14 For a full evaluation of the CIP, please refer to Technopolis Group (2010) Interim Evaluation of 
the Competitiveness  and  Innovation  Framework  Programme  (2007–2013),  Specific  Contract  No 
ENTR/A4/04/093/1/09/22 Implementing Framework Contract No ENTR/04/093, Lot 1 and CSES 
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it, the business would not have made the same level of investment. For the SMEG, about half 
of the SMEs said their business could not have been set up without the SMEG loan support. 
The evaluations, however, indicate a number of problems. The first is the need to improve 
strategic steering and coordination with other EU initiatives for SMEs. Coordination between 
the  various  DGs  that  manage  bits  and  pieces  of  the  CIP  has  not  been  optimal.  Another 
problem is potential overlap with other SME assistance under the Cohesion Policy. The CSES 
(2011)  evaluation  mentioned  some  overlaps,  but  didn’t  identify  any  particular  problems. 
Debt and equity platforms could play a useful role in this area, but overlaps and problems of 
coordination must be avoided in all future SME support programmes. 
As for the programmes’ European added value, the GIF has proven that this assistance was 
needed because it directly addresses the EU core objectives of innovation, growth and jobs. 
For  the  SMEG,  the  results  are  more  controversial.  Similar  national  schemes  for  assisting 
SMEs exist in many member states, and although a certain level of deadweight is inevitable 
when providing assistance on the basis of portfolios (ECA 2011), the programme has actually 
been  criticised  of  considerable  deadweight  loss  (an  estimated  38%)  by  the  Court  of 
Auditors.15  While the SMEG programme serves to develop SME programmes in countries 
where  there  is  no  such  assistance,  it  is  not  clear  that  it  should  operate  where  such 
instruments already exist. 
The  programme  indicates  that  there has  been substantial  leverage. For  the  GIF1  and  the 
GIF2, leverage has been estimated at 6.5. For the SMEG it has reached as much as 67 times 
over the period 1998–2008 (Technopolis Group 2010). However the EIF’s estimated leverage 
for 2011–2013 shows much lower expectations – respectively 3–5 and approximately 15 – 
which  probably  indicates  a  different  methodology  and  interpretation  of  leverage.  Such 
differences in interpretation of terms such as leverage or multiplier must be resolved by the 
equity and debt platforms or evaluations will not be consistent.  
The  proposals  for  COSME  go  some  way  in  addressing  the  weaknesses  identified  by 
evaluators, in particular by linking the GIF1 for start-up SMEs with the RSI programme for 
Horizon  2020.  This  will  avoid  overlaps.  However,  there  are  no  evaluations  on  potential 
overlaps with the Structural Funds operations that support SMEs under joint management. 
This is the result of the lack of coordination between the responsible DGs for different InFIs, 
the overall picture of EU InFI operations is often lost. 
Evaluations  of  the  present  programmes  call  for  COSME  to  improve  monitoring  and 
reporting. Annual Implementation Reports should include details of actual expenditure to 
improve transparency and provide a basis for evaluating efficiency. The Commission has in 
fact had difficulties tracing the use of funding offered to financial intermediaries. 
The impact of the programmes is not monitored using a standard set of indicators (outputs, 
results, outcomes and impacts) to record and report progress. Greater consistency will be 
needed in the future.  
 
 
                                                 
15  “In  the  context  of the  SMEG  facility,  it  is  considered  that  deadweight  occurs  if  guarantees  are 
provided for loans to SMEs with sufficient collateral and without innovative investments. (…) Other 
things being equal, these borrowers could have obtained the loans from commercial lenders without 
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Table 3. The COSME Assessment 
Principles  Assessment of COSME 
European Added 
Value  
The GIF programme addresses a core weakness in Europe, namely the lack 
of finance for innovative SMEs. EU action has introduced an important new 
financing scheme in member states. 
For the SMEG, the results are more controversial, since it also operates in 
countries  with  similar  instruments.  There  is  value  added  wherever  the 
instrument  can  creates  a  new  financial  stream,  but  where  it  replicates 
national instruments the need is questionable.  
Additionality  Evaluations consider the GIF to be ‘additional’. Doubts are raised for a some 
of the impacts of the SMEG facility.  
Addressing sub-
optimal investment  
The  GIF  addresses  a  clear  market  failure  where  innovative  SMEs  have 
lacked investment because of their risk profile and their size. 
For  the  SMEG,  this  is  less clear,  since some  countries  have  similar  SME 
financial schemes. The SMEG should not replicate or compete with national 
schemes. 
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
Both have a high leverage effect – based on different estimations. 
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
Assistance is capped, so the EU budget is not at risk. 
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
COSME  addresses  a  number  of  implementation  issues;  efficiency  is 
expected to increase.  
Visibility and 
awareness 
The uptake of the programmes shows the beneficiaries are aware of it, but 
not  necessarily  that  the  instruments  originate  from  EU  support. 
Programmes are run through financial intermediaries that do not always 
make the EU contribution sufficiently visible. 
Transparency  COSME  will  be  a  complex  programme;  but  despite  having  central 
management  it  will  need  an  improved  mechanism  for  reporting  and 
monitoring.  In  this  respect,  the  European  Commission  proposals  are 
pointing in the right direction. 
 
4.3  LGTT 
Since 2008, the European Union budget has provided loan guarantees under the LGTT (Loan 
Guarantee  instrument  for  Trans-European  Transport  Network  Projects)  programme,  an 
instrument that was developed by the European Commission and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). LGTT is financed by a capital contribution of €1 billion (€500 million each from 
the Commission’s budget for the Trans-European Transport Network, or TEN-T, and the 
EIB) with as much as a 20% guarantee for total senior debt that is intended to support up to 
€20 billion of senior loans. The LGTT allows the EIB to bear higher financial risks than under 
its normal lending operations, covering the first five to seven years of project operations. The 
instrument is intended to provide a debt-service guarantee for traffic risk, which is a key 
financial risk in the early operating stage of a demand-based transport project. Given the risk 
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principal of €200 million. It was expected that over a decade the instrument could mobilise 
loans (multiplier effect) to a level of €50 billion (EIB 2006, EIB 2008). 
Given the important changes in the financing environment since the LGTT’s conception, the 
up-take of the instrument has been slower than expected, with scarcities of banking funding 
and  public  resources  causing  delays  in  tendering  traffic  risk  projects  in  many  European 
countries.  Nevertheless,  the  LGTT  has  proven  to  be  a  critical  element  for  successfully 
financing  the  remaining  traffic  risk  projects.  In  fact,  since  2008  the  instrument  has  been 
implemented in almost all projects eligible in the road, rail and port sectors. By early 2012, 
seven  contracts  had  been  signed  for  an  amount  of  €400  million  with  LGTT  Facilities 
underpinning some €12 billion of capital investment. 
Although the LGTT has become a standard feature of traffic projects and is usually required 
by all co-lenders to the EIB as a precondition for their participation, the instrument has its 
limitations.  Risk  coverage  is  limited  to  traffic  demand,  which  makes  the  instrument 
unsuitable for availability risks (e.g. delays in construction and other problems impeding the 
successful use of the infrastructure). The LGTT was also designed to ease bank funding for 
infrastructure projects, but since all major markets have been hit by the strong contraction of 
available bank funding, in its current form the LGTT is not able to increase the available 
funding  base  provided  by  commercial  banks.  To  address  this  issue,  the  EIB  and  the 
Commission are developing instruments that allow for new funding models that are based 
on institutional investors’ capital resources. This accounts for the introduction of the Project 
Bonds Initiative (PBI) presented in Section 4.4. 
But despite the PBI, the LGTT will not be abolished. It will instead be reformed so as to be 
able to offer more flexibility and continue to support the remaining bank funding.  
Table 4. Assessment of the LGTT proposals 
Principles  Assessment of Proposals 
European Added 
Value  
The LGTT clearly addresses an area where funding is needed after the crash 
of traditional financiers of infrastructure projects.  
Additionality  The LGTT initiative is designed to guarantee an additional subordinated 
liquidity facility, thus ensuring additionality. 
Addressing sub-
optimal investment  
The LGTT is designed to provide protection for traffic risk exposure, a risk 
that  traditional  senior  lenders  will  not  take  in  transport  infrastructure, 
which leaves it to the public or private sector. 
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
Although the LGTT has been slow in uptake, final funding mobilised for 
seven contracts signed at the value of €400 million has reached €12 billion. 
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
Risks to the EU budget are capped to the funding earmarked for guarantees 
– that is, they are non-existent.  
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
Implementation  was  hampered  by  the  limited  risk  coverage  of  the 
instrument and inflexible procedures. This must be addressed for the next 
MFF. 
Visibility and 
awareness 
Potential beneficiaries are familiar with the LGTT. 
Transparency  The operations have been transparent. 
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4.4   Project Bonds  
The European Commission has proposed a pilot phase for Project Bonds that are initially 
limited to investment in the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for the period 2012–13.16 These 
Project  Bonds  were  designed  to  substitute  for  the  drop  in  financing  from  traditional 
financiers  (banks  and  monoline  insurance  companies  that  offer  debt  service  guarantees) 
because of the financial crisis. The Project Bonds are intended to attract funding from more 
conservative long-term investors, such as pension funds.  
In this straightforward mechanism, the EU budget will support the EIB delivering a first-loss 
debt  guarantee  of  up  to  20%  of  the  project’s  senior  debt.  This  combined  risk  guarantee 
should improve projects’ bankability and attract debt-capital market financing.  
The Project Bonds instrument (which are not to be confused with ‘Eurobonds’) that is based 
on LGTT mechanics appears to be a necessary tool for developing Europe’s infrastructure. 
But  Project  Bonds  are  not  a  panacea:  The  Bonds’  pricing  will  be  critical  for  attracting 
investors, as well as the quality of the infrastructures they finance. 
Project  Bonds  are  proposed  exclusively  for  infrastructures  financed  under  the  CEF  – 
transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure. It is estimated that under the CEF, 
€2 billion will be dedicated to new InFIs for transport projects and a further €1 billion for 
energy projects. This provisional estimate may need to be revised. A 15 to 20 multiplier effect 
has been estimated, meaning that €2 billion could result in projects of €30 to 40 billion.17 The 
actual leverage factor will vary by project.  
Although  the  design  of  Project  Bonds  is  not  finished,  some  basic  features  are  already 
apparent. It is based on the idea of ‘tranching’ (i.e. dividing) an issuer’s debt into layers of 
different seniority, dividing debt into separate groups, each with their own risks/returns 
profile to attract different kinds of investors. After a project company has been set up (a 
single-purpose vehicle), the financing for a particular infrastructure project can be divided 
into: 
a senior tranche issued as bonds to institutional investors such as insurance companies 
and pension funds; and  
a subordinated tranche underwritten by the EIB as a funded loan or a simple guarantee 
facility.  
The concept of (b) is similar to the system in place for the RSFF and the LGTT that helps 
reduce risks and borrowing costs – and ultimately attracts investors and buyers of bonds. 
Large projects would end up with three components (see Figure 5). 
                                                 
16  European  Commission,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council 
amending Decision No. 1639/2006/EC establishing a Competitiveness and Innovation Programme 
(2007–2013)  and  Regulation  (EC)  No.  680/2007  laying  down  general  rules  for  the  granting  of 
Community  financial  aid  in  the  field  of  the  trans-European  transport  and  energy  networks, 
COM(2011) 659, Brussels, 19.10.2011. 
17 EC (2011e) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the 
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Figure 5. Subordinated Project Bonds Instruments 
 
Source: EIB (2011) ‘Supporting the EU budget: the EIB contribution’, power-point presentation at the 
CEPS Task Force meeting, 22.06.2011 version. 
Like other joint financial instruments, the instrument provided by the EIB will be priced 
according to the EIB’s Credit Risk Policy Guidelines. A Cooperation Agreement between the 
Commission and the EIB will set out the risk-sharing principles and mechanism. 
Table 5. Project bonds 
Principles  Assessment of Proposals 
European Added 
Value  
The Project Bonds address an area where funding is clearly needed after the 
crash of the traditional infrastructure project financiers. Project Bonds are 
focused  on  the  important  trans-European  infrastructure  that  is  a  core 
element of the single market and linked to the need to develop low-carbon 
infrastructures to reach the 2020 and 2050 climate objectives.   
Additionality  The Project Bonds Initiative is designed for where financing is lacking, so 
additionality is ensured. 
Addressing sub-
optimal investment 
If correctly implemented, the Project Bonds Initiative will correct a market 
failure where important infrastructures with positive ERRs lack investment. 
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
The Project Bonds could raise considerable funding.   
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
Risks to the EU budget are non-existent as the risk capital is capped.  
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
This  new  instrument  cannot  be  evaluated  yet  but  it  seems  to  solve  the 
problems of the LGTT in terms of flexibility with the bond issuance and  
also  covers  more  areas  of  infrastructure.  But  whether  there  will  be  a 
demand for Project Bonds remains an open question. The bonds’ demand-
driven nature means that the trans-European network links of the CEF may 
not attract investors. This will only be apparent when it is implemented. 
The  Project  Bonds  should  integrate  the  need  to  prioritise  low-carbon 
infrastructures in line with the EU decarbonisation objectives. It is unclear 
how objectives and restrictions linked to EU objectives and strategies will 
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No agreement has been reached on reflows, i.e. the income from pricing the 
instrument.  If  reflows  cannot  be  reinvested  in  the  facility  based  on  the 
principle of a revolving fund, the efficiency of the Project Bonds will drop. 
Visibility and 
awareness 
Not applicable – new instrument 
Transparency  Not applicable – new instrument 
 
4.5  Financial instruments under the 2007–2013 Structural Funds 
InFIs have been used to deliver investments under the Structural Funds since the 1994–1999 
programming  period,  most  especially  for  SMEs.  InFIs’  relative  importance  and  scope 
increased  during  the  2007–2013  period  to  include  sustainable  urban  development  and 
regeneration, energy efficiency and renewable energy in buildings. During the 2007–2013 
programming period, member states and managing authorities (MAs) are permitted to use 
some  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and  European  Social  Fund  (ESF) 
resources to support InFIs. At a generic level, an InFI enables the combination of different 
funding sources (EU, national and private), providing additional financing to support SMEs, 
sustainable  urban  development  and  energy  efficiency,  and  contributing  to  the  Cohesion 
Policy’s  broader  objectives.  The  revolving  nature  of  funds  can support  a  wider  range  of 
interventions (especially in relation to grants under the Cohesion Policy) and increase the 
incentives for a project’s successful implementation since the expected return will be applied 
to new investments in support of the same objectives.  
InFIs  can  either  be  set  up  through  direct  contributions  to  equity  funds,  loan  funds  and 
guarantee fund mechanisms, or indirectly through holding funds that are set up to invest in 
several funds, thus permitting the involvement of national banks, both public and private 
(see Figure 6 for a graphic representation). Instruments are implemented through the various 
governance models and legal structures of each member state or region (EC 2011a), thus each 
project and each area of investment is different. Based on data through 2010, most holding 
funds are managed by public bodies such as national or regional development agencies, or 
financial institutions such as the EIB and EIF (EC 2012a).  
While  the  European  Commission  can  encourage  the  use  of  such  instruments,  the  final 
decision to use InFIs is made by the member state and the managing authority (MA). In the 
2007–2013 period, in cooperation with the EIB, the EIF and other financial institutions, the 
Commission developed a number of initiatives to boost the use of InFIs. Two initiatives were 
launched  to  promote  the  use  of  financial  engineering  instruments  –  JEREMIE  (Joint 
European  Resources  for  Micro  to  Medium  Enterprises)  and  JESSICA  (Joint  European 
Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) – and two technical assistance facilities 
were also launched – JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions) 
and JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Micro-Finance Institutions in Europe). The JEREMIE 
and JESSICA networking platforms were launched in 2009 to support the exchange of know-
how and good practice. A number of procedural manuals, handbooks and guidance notes 
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Figure 6. The Set-up of financial instruments in Structural Funds in 2007–2013 
 
Source: EC 2012a. 
The legal framework on financial instruments under the Cohesion Policy in the 2007–2013 
period  was  not  very  detailed  at  first  but  the  Commission  subsequently  developed  more 
specific  guidance  notes  and  introduced  amendments  to  the  legislation  (EC  2012a).  For 
example, Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 did not require member states to provide detailed 
reporting data on InFIs. An EC guidance note (EC 2011c) included a template for monitoring 
reports  to  enable  member  states  and  MAs  to  monitor  and  voluntarily  report  on 
implementation  to  the  Commission  annually.  Then  a  2011  amendment  to  the  General 
Regulation  (Regulation  No  1310/2011)  made  yearly  reporting  on  InFIs  obligatory  for 
member states and the Commission. However, the data will only be available from 2013, and 
until then, the Commission must rely on voluntary reporting by member states. 
InFIs  co-financed  by  the  ERDF  are  included  in  the  scope  of  audits  carried  out  by  the 
Commission.  In  2011  the  Commission  also  initiated  an  audit  plan  for  the  set-up  and 
implementation of InFIs that will cover InFIs in a number of member states (RO, LT, DE, EL, 
PL, UK, HU and PT) and present the results by the end of 2012 (EC 2012a). Four audits of the 
ESF  were  carried  out  by  late  2011  (EC  2012a).  InFIs  were  also  covered  in  the  Court  of 
Auditors’ 2010 annual report and in the Court’s opinions on the Commission proposals to 
revise  the  Financial  Regulation  and  proposals  for  the  2014–2020  Cohesion  Policy.  Other 
studies have been carried out for the European Parliament and by institutions involved in 
delivering InFIs (EC 2012a).   
By the end of 2010, around 5% of the ERDF allocations in the current programming period 
were committed to InFIs; and around 0.7% of declared ESF eligible expenditures were allocated 
to InFIs (EC 2012a). Contributions of EU Structural Funds used for InFIs are capped, so the 
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The multiplier effect of the InFI depends on the type of instrument, its sector and contextual 
conditions.  Based  on  information  to  date,  the  following  multiplier  effects  have  been 
estimated by the Commission: 
For an equity-related InFI: €1 billion of public resources led to equity investments in 
enterprises of between €1 billion  and €3.40 billion (EC 2012a); 
For a guarantee-related InFI: € 1 billion of public resources supported the disbursement 
of loans to enterprises of between €1billion to € 7.50 billion (EC 2012a); and 
For a loan-related InFI: € 1 billion of public resources mobilised loans in the range of 
€1billion to €2 billion (EC 2012a). 
The  2012  ECA  report  mentioned  the  ERDF  InFIs’  limitations  in  leveraging  private 
investments (ECA 2011). Although the report explains that this is due to the lack of a legally 
binding  leverage  requirement,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  ECA  report  is  based  on  a 
comparison with other centrally managed EU programmes for SMEs. It does not take into 
account  that  InFIs  under  the  Cohesion  Policy  seek  to  fulfil  specific  convergence-related 
objectives, whereas InFIs in other sectors seek to meet different objectives (e.g. competition 
objectives)  and  operate  in  different  regions  (e.g.  regions  with  more  developed  financial 
markets).  
An overall assessment of the InFIs used in the Cohesion Policy is complicated by the fact that 
the  effect/impact  of  the  instrument  varies  according  to  the  type  of  instrument used,  the 
sector in which it is applied and various contextual conditions. The overall uptake of InFIs 
has not been optimal. This is partly due to the need for a cultural shift in the MA and final 
beneficiaries, both of whom had become accustomed to grant financing and at first were 
reluctant to try a new, unfamiliar funding instrument. There also have been issues related to 
the lack of awareness and understanding of the instruments and limited visibility at the 
national/regional/local level. It also took time for the InFIs to become operational because of 
the need to set up structures to provide financial support to the project and partnerships and 
build relevant knowledge within the MA administrations, etc. – which was compounded by 
the novelty of setting up these processes, and the different levels of expertise and market 
development across member states. The instruments’ slow deployment was also related to 
the inappropriateness of the  Structural Funds’ regulatory framework (ECA 2012), which 
required successive interpretations and set requirements that were sometimes unattractive to 
the private sector.  
Capacity issues both in MAs and among final recipients, as well as delays in selecting financial 
intermediaries, led to delays in launching and delivering funds. There have also been some 
instances of resources that were allocated going unused to InFIs (EC 2012a), and concerns 
about the quality of certain ex-ante assessments carried out before the introduction of InFIs 
(ECA 2012). There have been concerns relating to the coherence between certain instruments 
(e.g.  JEREMIE  and  CIP)  (GHK  2010),  as  well  as  a  lack  of  alignment  between  different 
financial  support  schemes  under  the  Cohesion  Policy,  such  as  funds  for  jobs  (from  the 
European Social Fund) and for urban development (JESSICA). Due to InFIs’ limited scope of 
application under shared management and delays in operationalisation of the instruments, 
their potential to contribute to EU objectives and achieve a critical mass of investments in 
relation to SMEs, sustainable urban development and energy efficiency  has either not been 
optimised or been delayed. Experiences vary considerably across different member states. 
4.5.1  Proposals for InFIs under the 2014–2020 Structural and Cohesion Funds 
Building on experience gained during the 2007–2013 period and introducing a number of 
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Cohesion Funds call for expanding and strengthening the use of InFIs. A separate section on 
InFIs – Title IV (Articles 32 to 40) – is included in the proposal for a regulation setting out 
common provisions for the five Common Strategic Framework Funds (CSF): the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund, 
the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  and  the  European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (EC 2011b). This provides a set of rules governing InFIs 
for all five CSF Funds and allows for a clearer presentation of the specificities and regulatory 
requirements of the instruments, thereby responding to the European Parliament’s request 
that  InFIs  in  the  Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  be  simplified  and  subjected  to  greater 
democratic  scrutiny  (European  Parliament  2011). Implementation  details  will  be  given  in 
secondary legislation (Delegated Acts and Implementing Acts) (EC 2011).  
The  details  of  the  specific  instruments  to  be  introduced  under  the  future  Structural  and 
Cohesion Funds are still under discussion. The section below sets out the general provisions 
that  have  been  proposed,  drawing  on  the  provisions  set  out  in  the  Common  Provisions 
Regulation and recent Commission documents (specifically the February 2012 Staff Working 
Document on InFIs in the Cohesion Policy) as well as presentations and fact-sheets focusing 
on InFIs in the Cohesion Policy. The analysis is based on provisions set out in the original 
Commission proposals. The final legislative text may differ substantially to the proposals.  
Scope  
Under the current legislative framework, InFIs’ use is limited to specific types of projects, for 
example, SMEs and sustainable urban development under the ERDF, and business start-ups 
under the ESF (Article 44 on financial engineering instruments of Council Regulation (EC) 
1083/2006). The proposals for the 2014–2020 period lift this limitation, expanding the scope 
of InFIs to all types of projects and activities, sectors and beneficiaries. For the first time, 
InFIs  will  also  be  allowed  under  the  Cohesion  Fund.  Member  states  and  managing 
authorities  (MA)  will  be  permitted  to  use  InFIs  for  all  thematic  objectives  and  priorities 
covered by Operational Programmes (OPs) – provided that they demonstrate the economic 
viability of final recipients and the repayment capacity of the projects (EC 2012a). While the 
European Commission can encourage the use of such instruments, the final decision about 
using InFIs is made by the member state and the MA. 
The Commission proposes removing the current provision that a project cannot be financed 
by more than one source, and sets out rules for enabling the combination of InFIs with other 
forms of support, in particular grants. Blending of (different) grants and loans supported by 
the EU budget will be allowed and final recipients of InFIs will also be permitted to receive 
grants  or  other  assistance  from  another  programme  or  instrument  supported  by  the  EU 
budget (EC 2012a). This provision is in line with the European Parliament recommendation 
(European Parliament 2011) urging an improved mix of financing instruments, including 
grants, loans or revolving funds in order to more efficiently use EU resources. The optimal 
blending level depends on the local context conditions and the project in question; however, 
some form of criteria will be needed to assess the proportion of the project that is eligible for 
grant financing and that which can be supported through InFIs. In a renovation project, for 
example, the costs of an energy audit and feasibility study could be covered by a grant while 
the costs of the renovation itself could be covered through an InFI.  
Ex-ante assessment 
Operational Programmes contain a new provision requiring InFIs to be designed on the basis 
of an ex-ante assessment that identifies market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, 
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an  assessment  could  cover  potential  private  sector  involvement,  the  InFI’s  added  value, 
questions  of  critical  mass  and  possibilities  for  economies  of  scale  (EC  2012a).  Such  an 
assessment  aims  to  avoid  overlaps  and  inconsistencies  between  funding  instruments 
implemented by actors across different levels (EC 2011). The ex-ante assessment should also 
partly respond to some criticism about how existing instruments function (e.g. by the ECA 
2012). Detailed rules on the ex-ante assessment will be set out in the delegated acts.  
Implementation options 
The proposals set out three implementation options for using InFIs (EC 2011, EC 2012a): 
InFIs set up at the EU level that are directly or indirectly managed by the Commission: Under 
this  option,  member  states  can  invest  part  of  their  Structural  Funds  in  EU-level 
instruments (e.g. the EEEF) which will be ring-fenced for investments in regions and 
actions covered by the OP that made the contributions. The instruments will be used to 
support actions and final recipients consistent with the contributory programme or 
programmes. 
InFIs set up at the national or regional level managed in line with the draft Common 
Provisions Regulation and related secondary legislation (shared management): Under 
this option, managing authorities can contribute programme resources to: 
Standardise (‘off-the-shelf’) instruments for which the terms and conditions will be laid 
down in a Commission Implementing Act. Standardised ready-to-use templates will be 
developed  to  address  issues  such  as  alignment with  guidelines  for state  aid.  These 
standardised instruments should rectify some of the implementation delays of existing 
instruments. 
Tailor existing or new InFIs to specific conditions and needs. 
InFIs consisting solely of loans or guarantees: Under this option, managing authorities can 
provide  loans  or  guarantees  directly  to  the  beneficiary,  for  example,  a  regional 
development agency, with the MAs being reimbursed on the basis of the actual loans 
provided or by guarantee amounts blocked for new loans. Management costs or fees 
cannot be charged to the CSF Fund. 
When supporting InFIs under Option 2, the MA may (EC 2011b):  
Invest in the capital of existing or new legal entities, 
Entrust  implementation  to  the  EIB,  international  financial  institutions  in  which  a 
member state is a shareholder, financial institutions established in a member state, or a 
body governed by public or private law selected in accordance with applicable EU and 
national rules, 
Directly implement InFIs that solely consist of loans or guarantees. 
The  delegated  act  will  set  out  rules  concerning  funding  agreements  and  the  role  and 
responsibility of the entities entrusted with the implementation tasks, as well as management 
costs and fees. 
Co-financing modalities and additional financial incentives 
The  European  Commission  proposals  foresee  a  separate  priority  axis  in  the  OP  for 
contributions to EU-level InFIs under direct management (Implementation Option 1), with a 
co-financing rate of up to 100% (EC 2011). It remains to be seen whether this distinction 
between EU-level and national instruments is part of the final legislative text.  
For contributions to national or regional InFIs under shared management (Implementation 
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taking into account the InFI’s capital requirements (EC 2011). These provisions have been 
introduced,  inter  alia,  to  respond  to  ECA  criticism  about  delays  in  payments  to  the  final 
beneficiaries (ECA 2012). 
In cases where a priority axis is fully implemented through InFIs, the Commission proposes 
increasing the EU co-financing share by 10 percentage points (EC 2011).  
Financial management rules 
The following provisions are proposed for the qualification of financial streams at various 
levels of InFIs (EC 2011): 
EU contributions to InFIs are to be placed in interest-bearing accounts in member states 
or temporarily invested. 
Interest or other gains generated at the InFI level prior to investment in final recipients 
is to be used for the same purposes as the initial EU contribution. 
The EU share of capital resources paid back from investments is to be reinvested in 
accordance with the OP objectives in the same or other InFIs for at least 10 years after 
programme closure. 
EU share of gains/earnings/yields generated by investments are to be further invested 
in the same or other instruments in line with the OP, for management costs/fees, or for 
the  preferential  remuneration  of  investors  operating  under  the  market-economy 
investor principle. 
Reporting  
The new framework requires Managing Authorities to submit a specific report on operations 
relating to InFIs as an annex to the annual implementation report sent to the Commission. 
The reports must:  
Identify the programme and priority from which the CSF-Funds support is provided; 
Describe the InFI and its implementation arrangements; 
Identify the bodies entrusted with implementation; 
Include support paid into the InFI; 
Describe support paid or committed in guarantee contracts by the InFI to the final 
recipients by programme and priority or measure; 
List revenues of and repayments to the InFI; 
Show the multiplier effect of InFI investments, their value and participations; 
Describe  the  InFI  contribution  to  achieving  the  programme  indicators  and  the 
corresponding priority (EC 2011b). 
Uniform  conditions  for  the monitoring  and  provision  of  information  to  the  Commission, 
including for InFIs, are to be set out in the implementing act.   
Evaluating the proposals 
These proposed general provisions should begin to address a number of shortcomings in 
InFI implementation under the Cohesion Policy. However, negotiations are continuing, so 
the final provisions may be quite unlike the proposals. More specific details are expected to 
be set out in the delegated and implementing acts for the 2014–2020 period that will include 
provisions  about:  the  minimum  requirements  for  the  ex-ante  assessment  of  InFIs;  the 
combination of support to final recipients through grants, interest rate subsidies, guarantee 
fee subsidies and financial instruments; additional rules on eligibility of expenditure; rules 50 | NÚÑEZ FERRER, VOLKERY, WITHANA & MEDAROVA-BERGSTROM 
 
specifying the types of activities which may not be supported through financial instruments 
(EC 2011); the treatment of private investors; the multiplier ratios to be ensured; the basic 
parameters for selecting bodies to implement InFIs; and the transfer and management of 
assets (EC 2012a).  
The following table provides an overall assessment of the proposals. It is important to note 
that the InFI’s effect/impact  varies according to the type of instrument used, the sector in 
which it is applied and the contextual conditions. The table provides a generic overview 
assessment of the proposals for InFIs in the Cohesion Policy. 
Table 6. Overview assessment of proposals for InFIs for the 2014–2020 Cohesion Policy  
Principles  Assessment of Proposals 
European Added 
Value  
Each  InFI  will  be  based  on  an  ex-ante  assessment  that  will,  inter  alia, 
individually evaluate the InFI’s added value. InFIs are to be used in line 
with OP objectives that should be aligned with the Europe 2020 Strategy 
and ensure the best possible use of EU funds. As noted in the Commission’s 
response  to  the  2012  ECA  report  (ECA  2012),  when  approving  OPs, 
emphasis will be placed on ensuring alignment with the EU 2020 strategic 
priorities and their identification/fulfilment of ex-ante conditionalities, as 
well as on evaluating the rationale for the proposed form of support. 
Additionality  The  ex-ante  assessment  will  identify  any  market  failures  or  sub-optimal 
investment  situations  and  investment  needs,  and  be  important  for 
evaluating the InFI’s additionality with a view to not crowding out private 
investments. The ex-ante assessment will also assess whether any other EU 
instruments are active in the area so as to reduce potential overlaps and 
ensure better disbursement of EU funds.  
Correcting a market 
failure  
The  ex-ante  assessment  should  identify  whether  the  individual  InFI 
addresses a market failure/gap. 
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
The share of the ERDF, the ESF and the ESF which will be used for InFIs 
will  only  be  known  at  the  end  of  the  2014–2020  programming  period 
because it depends on the MAs’ uptake of the instruments in implementing 
their  OPs.  Some  early  Commission  estimates  suggest  that the  volume  of 
ERDF  resources  that  could  be  delivered  through  InFIs  in  the  next 
programming  period  could  increase  by  a  factor  of  three    (i.e.  to 
approximately 15%) (EC 2012b). 
The leverage effect will depend on the particular InFI, the specific financial 
products  developed  and  the  sector  in  which  it  is  applied.  Options  to 
maximise  the  leverage  effect  through,  for  example,  informal  agreements 
with private banks (such as co-investment schemes) could be explored on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
The  EU  Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  contributions  used  for  InFIs  are 
capped in order to limit the EU-budget risk to the amount allocated to the 
various instruments. 
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
The efficiency of the three proposed implementation modes is not yet clear. 
Although  implementing  Option  1  (EU-level  InFIs)  may  help  address 
capacity constraints in some member states or regions that lack expertise on 
InFIs and might also improve coordination between various EU funding 
instruments, it implies that financing will circulate across different levels 
(EU, national and regional) and that might entail transaction costs.  
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Principles  Assessment of Proposals 
Implementation of Option 2a (‘off-the-shelf’ instruments) may help speed 
implementation and reduce management costs of InFIs, thus responding to 
criticisms  of  existing  InFIs.  Such  templates  could  also  help  to  improve 
compatibility with EU rules. Given regional particularities, however, InFIs 
are not likely to be applicable in all scenarios. Implementation Option 2b 
(tailor-made instruments) can benefit from experience gained with existing 
instruments  and  may  allow  greater  flexibility  in  terms  of  addressing 
regional  issues.  But  it  might  also  encounter  the  same  issues  of  capacity 
constraints, etc.   
Under Implementation Option 3, member states can directly give the final 
recipient loans or guarantees, avoiding the need to set up a holding fund 
and speeding the lending process.  
Visibility and 
awareness 
Technical  assistance  and  guidance  for  advisory  services  and  capacity 
building  are  to  be  provided  to  MAs  and  final  recipients    (EC  2012a). 
However,  since  these  details  are  not  yet  clear,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
proposals remains to be seen. General provisions relating to the visibility of 
grants and InFIs are to be set out in the delegated and implementing act. 
The  DG  REGIO  is  currently  exploring  setting  up  a  technical  assistance 
platform for MAs. It would be useful to involve the EIB or the EIF in this 
platform  because  of  their  experience  in    setting  up  multiple  financial 
instruments under the Structural Funds in this programming period. Issues 
of limited awareness and visibility of InFIs in the current period call for 
increased efforts.  
Transparency  The  proposals  require  regular,  detailed  reporting  by  MAs  in  line  with 
uniform  conditions.  If  reporting  heeds  the  provisions  about  quality  and 
consistency, InFIs operations can be expected to become more transparent. 
The reports are also expected to cover InFIs’ contribution to achieving the 
indicators of the programme and of the priority that is concerned.  
 
4.6  Financial Instruments in EU external action: the new blending facilities 
The European Union is committed to fulfilling the aid-effectiveness goals set out in the Paris 
Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), as well as the European Code of 
Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy (2007). The European Commission, 
along  with  a  number  of  EU  member  states  and  European  development  financiers,  has 
launched new financing instruments for operations outside the EU that aim to translate these 
commitments  into  real  action.  Called  loan  and  grant  blending  facilities  (LGBFs),  these 
instruments link EU-budget grants, which are sometimes topped up by member state grants, 
with loans by international and European Bilateral Financial Institutions (EBFIs), such as the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the KfW 
Bankengruppe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
Council  of  Europe  Development  Bank  (CEB).  Other  financiers,  including  local  private 
financial institutions, can participate in project financing and indirectly benefit from the risk-
dampening  effect  of  EU  grants  and  accredited  financiers.  However,  direct  access  to  EU 
grants (especially guarantees) is only for accredited (generally public) institutions. 
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Table 7. Overview of EU blending facilities in external action 
Name of facility 
Region covered 
Launch date  grant funds allocated   Participating financiers  
ITF: Infrastructure Trust 
Fund for Africa 
47 African Countries18 
2007  €308.7 m from 10th EDF 
+ €64 m from MS 
budgets (as of 
31.12. 2010) 
AFD, AfDB, BIO, 
COFIDES, EIB, 
FINNFUND, KfW, Lux-
Development, MoF 
Greece, OeEB, PIDG, 
SIMEST, SOFID  
NIF: Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility  
Countries eligible for the 
European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI)19 
2008  €700 m for 2007–2013 
from EU budget +  
€64.4 m from MS 
budgets (as of 
31.12. 2011) 
AECID, AFD, CEB, 
EBRD, EIB, KfW, NIB, 
OeEB, SIMEST, SOFID 
WBIF: Western Balkan 
Investment Framework 
Western Balkans20 
2009  €166 m from EU budget 
+ €10 m EIB, €10 m 
EBRD, €10 m CEB + 
€47.6 m in grants from 
MS budgets (+ 
Norway) (as of  
31.12. 2011) 
CEB, EBRD, EIB, World 
Bank Group, KfW, MFB, 
CMZR, OeEB, SID 
LAIF: Latin America 
Investment Facility 
Latin American Countries21 
2010  €125 m from the 2010–
2013 EU budget 
AFD, BCIE, IDB, CAF, 
EIB, KfW, NIB, OeEB 
IFCA: Investment facility for 
Central Asia 
Central Asian countries22 
2010  €20 m from the 2010 EU 
budget 
NIF accredited 
institutions can 
participate. 
Asia Investment Facility 
Asian Countries23 
2011  €30 m from the EU 
budget 
EIB, EBRD, NIB, ADB, 
AFD, KfW, OeEB, 
SIMEST, SOFID 
 
                                                 
18  Angola,  Benin,  Botswana,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad, 
Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, São Tomé & Principe, Ghana, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Kenya,  Somalia,  Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Comoros, 
Seychelles,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Cape  Verde,  Gambia,  Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
19 Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria and Tunisia 
20 Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, FYROM and Serbia 
21 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela 
22 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
23 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, DRP Korea, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
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Name of facility 
Region covered 
Launch date  grant funds allocated   Participating financiers  
Caribbean Investment Facility 
ACP Caribbean countries24 
2012  €40 m from 10th EDF  EIB, NIB, CDB, IDB, 
others joining 
Investment Facility for the 
Pacific 
ACP-Pacific countries25 
2012  €10 m from 10th EDF  EIB, AFD, KfW, 
AUSAID, ADB, NZAID, 
WB 
Source: Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012, forthcoming). 
The uncontestedly positive results of these instruments in terms of leverage and multiplier 
effects are reviewed in detail in Núñez Ferrer and Behrens (2011) and Núñez Ferrer et al. 
(2012, forthcoming). Grants offered by the European Commission and EU member states in 
the framework of the facilities – with important loans granted by participating accredited 
financiers and other financial institutions, as well as the recipients’ own contributions and 
private sector investments – have leveraged substantial volumes of additional development 
finance. For a grant element of €848.7 million, European donors have provided additional 
development finance in the form of concessional loans worth €14 billion for projects with a 
total value close to €28 billion – which represents a multiplier effect of over 30. The costs of 
the blending instruments are modest: The combined European Development Fund (EDF) 
and  EU  budget  funds  for  development  come  to  €14  billion,  and  the  overall  EU  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) totals €53.4 billion for 2010.  
Figure 7. Total Grants, financiers’ loans and other funding in the LGBFs (EUR million) 
 
Source: Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012, forthcoming) The data is from the facilities’ annual reports. The ITF 
figures only list projects that were in an investment phase on 24.03.2011, while figures for the 
other facilities are for all projects approved to 31.12.2011. The LAIF figures are from the DG 
DEVCO website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/ 
laif/projects_en.htm 
                                                 
24  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Dominica,  Dominican  Republic,  Grenada, 
Guyana,  Haiti,  Jamaica,  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saint  Lucia,  Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 
25 Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Salomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 54 | NÚÑEZ FERRER, VOLKERY, WITHANA & MEDAROVA-BERGSTROM 
 
Proposals  for  these  instruments  foresee  a  considerable  increase  in  funding  from  the  EU 
budget but no precise figures have been published. A platform for external cooperation to 
increase  coherence  between  the  different  instruments  is  being  considered.  While  the 
Commission units that deal with the blending mechanism for external action are beginning 
to  cooperate  more  closely,  the  platform  must  ensure  appropriate  rules  for  all  blending 
instruments.  
Despite  the  positive  aspects  of  the  blending  facilities,  caution  regarding  the  use  of  debt 
instruments  in  developing  countries  is  necessary  as  they  may  not  be  suitable  for  many 
poverty eradication programmes. The focus on ‘profitable’ projects leads to the selection of 
projects that need revenue-raising sources, thereby cutting off the poor from related benefits. 
As debt instruments, they also may be unsuitable for highly indebted countries. Rules are 
needed to ensure a pro-poor approach while avoiding excessive indebtedness. 
Table 8. Overview assessment of blending instruments in EU external action  
Principles  Assessment of current blending instruments  
European Added 
Value  
The InFIs present one of the few cases in which the aid-effectiveness goals 
set out in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
and the European Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development 
Policy (2007) have effectively been put into practice.  
The coordination of the InFIs has considerably increased the EU’s influence 
in the development strategies of beneficiary countries. Acting as a single 
development instrument, the EU’s combined development funding power 
competes for influence with other large IFIs, such as the World Bank. This is 
achieved with very low EU-budget investment.  
Additionality  The  instruments’  annual  reports  indicate  a  real  increase  in  development 
finance  wherever  the  instruments  are  introduced,  thereby  creating 
additional funding. The risk of substituting other funding is limited and the 
instruments are designed to involve local financial institutions. While the 
risk of crowding out local finance or finance by other IFIs does exist, this is 
being addressed by drawing the financial institutions into the facilities as 
financiers and co-financiers. 
Correcting a market 
failure 
The  instruments  offer  risk  guarantees  for  development  finance,  thus 
allowing projects that otherwise could not have seen the light of day. The 
coordination of financiers and the European Commission further increases 
effectiveness  and  improved targeting  of  the  market  failures  identified  in 
developing countries. 
Leverage and 
multiplier effect 
The  leverage  and  multiplier  effect  are  estimated  to  be  extremely  high, 
presently estimated at 30 times the EU-budget contribution. 
Budgetary stability 
and risk-sharing 
profile 
The risk is capped to the level of the EU-budget contribution. 
Efficiency of 
implementation 
setting 
Coordinating the development actions of the various EU institutions and 
member states promotes coherence and helps avoid duplication of efforts. 
The  structure  of  the  facilities  is  designed  to  make donors and  financiers 
pool their resources and know-how to support the respective EU regional 
development strategies. This is of particular importance for development 
projects that a single actor could not tackle alone because of the magnitude 
of the financing, risk or management capacity, or that could not have been 
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Principles  Assessment of current blending instruments  
The emergence of LGBFs has qualitatively improved the effectiveness and 
impact  of  development  assistance,  increasing  the  added  value  of  EU 
development  financing  by  avoiding  duplications  of  effort  and 
uncoordinated parallel projects, as well as by merging individual projects 
into one larger, more coherent project.  
There are, however, some problems of coherence and structure. While the 
facilities’ basic architecture – a strategic board, an operational board and a 
financiers group – is similar, the rules about their composition, set-up or use 
of  grants  differ  because  of  the  ad-hoc  manner  in  which  they  were 
developed. Some of the differences are dictated by needs on the ground or 
by various EU regional strategies. Others are shaped by the preferences of 
different DGs, which – on behalf of the European Commission – have set up 
the facilities based on their regional responsibilities as well as the various 
EU  funds  (e.g.  the  European  Development  Fund,  the  European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Development Cooperation 
Instrument or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) that are utilised. 
A third set of differences stems from the absence of basic principles for all 
facilities.  
For example, the basic parameters on loan grant blending were established 
by the Working Group on the Additionality of Grants in the Framework of 
Blending Mechanisms called for by the ECOFIN Council in 2009 (see EC 
2009), whereas the grant instruments that the facilities could offer (that are 
presented in the same report) have not all been used and each instrument 
has picked up some and not others. This must be addressed in the future 
EU Platform for Development and Cooperation. 
Funds  are  variously  provided  by  the  different  facilities.  Only  the 
Infrastructure Trust Fund for Africa (ITF) has a fully common trust fund for 
member  states  contributions  and  European  funds.  The  NIF  has  separate 
trust  funds  for  the  member  states  and  for  the  EU-budget  grants.  The 
Western Balkan facility has five funds, one from the European Commission, 
one from the member states and three from partner International Financial 
Institutions  (the  EBRD,  the  EIB  and  the  CEB).  To  eliminate  unnecessary 
complexity, the West Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF) should merge 
all five funds into one this year. 
Separate  grant  funds  are  not  a  problem  per  se  except  for  the  additional 
administrative complications and costs that may be incurred by the parallel 
management  of  different  funds.  The  question  of  whether  the  European 
Commission should eventually manage trust funds is being addressed in 
the financial regulations review. 
Visibility and 
awareness 
The  LGBFs  have  increased  joint  European  action  for  development  and 
elevated European visibility in the concerned regions. The facilities have 
also become centres for strategic dialogue with beneficiaries on large-scale 
development  projects  and  collaboration  and  coordination  platforms  for 
financiers. The visibility and coordination with beneficiary countries have 
increased awareness of the different instruments at all levels. 
Transparency  Because they were recently established, the facilities do not yet have unified 
standards for monitoring and evaluation. Individual project monitoring is 
currently  ensured  by  the  lead  financial  institution,  which  has  a  primary 
interest in ensuring the project’s development and sustainability. To justify 
the facilities to donors and European institutions, a project’s progress and 
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Principles  Assessment of current blending instruments  
Selective  minimum monitoring and evaluation requirements could increase 
comparability  and  provide  a  coherent  basis  for  information  about  how 
operations perform under the various facilities – without causing excessive 
surcharges to the lead financier. Because the procedures were assessed for 
the  financiers’  accreditation,  the  European  Commission  should  generally 
accept the lead financiers’ standards – insofar as they are compatible with 
EU reporting obligations. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
InFIs  bring  a  new  dimension  to  the  EU  budget.  They  allow  for  EU  financial  support  to 
expand considerably by mobilising funding from public and private financial institutions 
with limited risk and low levels of resources. Although these instruments could replace other 
types of grant support, they should instead be viewed as being complementary. InFIs also 
allow for greater distinction between different projects or between those parts of individual 
projects that need direct grants and those that, at least partially, can be realised with loan 
funding.  By  combining  grants  and  loans, InFIs impact  the  overall  cost-benefit  balance  of 
projects, enabling projects and sector investment programmes that otherwise would not have 
seen the light of day. Grant elements help to reduce the overall costs and risks of projects, 
and  make  projects  bankable  by  overcomming  market  failures  or  other  financial  barriers. 
They  raise  the  creditworthiness  of  projects.  But  InFIs  cannot  be  used  for  projects  with 
benefits that are largely of a ‘public good’ nature, since most such benefits cannot be directly 
priced and do not produce revenue.  
Appropriate governance structures are required for InFIs to avoid overlaps, inconsistencies 
and  differences  in  reporting,  implementation  and  monitoring.  Because  InFIs  are  market 
driven, proper governance structures would allow for flexibility by taking into account the 
financial instruments’ strengths and weaknesses. Instrument choice and market decisions 
should  largely  be  left  to  financial  institutions,  while  EU  institutions  should  develop  the 
policy objectives and rules for evaluation and monitoring. The proposed equity and debt 
platforms and the envisaged EU Platform for Cooperation and Development should develop 
coherent rules for the efficient use of internal and external InFIs.  These ‘platforms’ could be 
modelled  on  the  current  FIEG  and  chaired  by the  DG  ECFIN.  However,  they should  be 
complemented by a policy steering group with representatives from the EU budgetary arms 
(the  European  Council  and  the  European Parliament)  and  technical  groups  composed  of 
financiers. 
Proposals  for  the  next  MFF  address  many  shortcomings  and  concerns.  But  the  financial 
instruments would be able to greatly increase their potential by pooling resources to allow 
for  larger  risk  spread  and  by  lowering  the  capital  requirement  (from  the  extremely 
conservative 100% coverage) in order to create a much larger multiplier effect. Similarly, the 
re-use of reflows to recapitalise instruments and enable operations to continue sustainably 
and efficiently should be adopted as a general principle.  
For funds under shared management, European Commission proposals for the 2014–2020 
EU  Structural  and Cohesion  Funds  expand  and  strengthen  the  use  of  InFIs,  building  on 
experience gained during the 2007–2013 period and also introducing a number of novelties. 
In particular, the proposed ex-ante assessments of the instruments will be critical, inter alia, 
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investment situations and investment needs, and will also be important for evaluating the 
instrument’s additionality in order to not crowd out private investments. These assessments 
should  help  reduce  potential  overlaps  between  different  InFIs  and  ensure  better 
disbursement of EU funds. The high quality of these assessments must be ensured. To that 
end, reporting provisions are strengthened in the proposals, with MAs required to submit a 
specific  report  on  operations  relating  to InFIs  in  an  annex  to  the  annual  implementation 
report  sent  to  the  Commission.  These  reports  must  address  the  multiplier  effect  of 
investments and the InFI’s contribution to achieving the indicators of the programme and of 
the priority concerned. If the quality and consistency of these reports are in line with the 
stated provisions, the transparency of the InFIs operations can be expected to improve.  
The Structural and Cohesion Funds propose three implementation modes for using InFIs 
that could improve operations: EU-level InFIs, ‘off-the-shelf’ instruments, and more direct 
funding to beneficiaries without a holding fund. While EU-level InFIs might help address 
capacity constraints in some member states or regions, it might also entail transaction costs. 
‘Off-the shelf’ instruments could help to speed  implementation and reduce management 
costs but may fail to respond to regional specificities.  
The  proposed  provisions  should  begin  to  address  the  shortcomings  of  InFIs  under  the 
Structural Funds. More specific details of the instruments will be set out in the envisaged 
delegated and implementing acts for the 2014–2020 period which might include provisions, 
inter alia, on minimum requirements for the ex-ante assessment of InFIs, the combination of 
InFIs  with  grants  and  the  eligibility  of  expenditure.  The  Commission  has  already  made 
details about the envisaged delegated and implementing acts available to the Council and 
the European Parliament. The delegated acts will be finalised following the adoption of the 
Common Provisions Regulation. Parliament’s thorough and active engagement – finalising 
the Common Provisions Regulation and discussing the delegated and implementing acts – 
will help to ensure that the new provisions for InFIs are effectively implemented. In the years 
ahead,  it  will  be  important  to  review  the  regular  reports  on  InFIs  by  the  MAs  and  the 
European Commission to assess whether the instruments are operating as envisaged. 
In relation to the area of external action, the proposed blending instruments give a new 
dimension to EU development plans and a positive addition to existing aid. Nevertheless, 
greater coherence is needed between the instruments, as well as clearer and more consistent 
reporting. It is also important to ensure that the development objectives and the need to 
assist  the  poor  are  not  neglected  in  the  pursuit  of  revenue-generating  projects.  Special 
attention must be given to avoid beneficiary countries becoming over-indebted.  
The European Commission proposals for the 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework 
introduce  marked  improvements  to  the  InFIs  by  reducing  overlaps  and  improving 
monitoring. But further improvements are necessary to maximise the impact and efficiency 
of InFIs. 
For all InFIs we recommend: 
a) Expanding the efficiency and multiplier effects: 
Use  more  realistic  capital  requirements  to  cover  defaults,  thereby  allowing  higher 
leverage and multiplier impacts. 
Reduce fund fragmentation in specific areas and regions. Pooling the resources, even 
for  earmarked  funding,  will  permit  a  higher  leverage  and  multiplier  for  the  risk 
spread. 
Allow  for  reflows  from  the  instruments  to  recapitalise  them  and  generate  more 
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b) Developing better governance structures:  
Coherent  basic  rules  on  the  obligations  and  benefits  for  financial  institutions  are 
necessary. Ad-hoc differences in implementation and remuneration of financiers, as 
well as monitoring, reporting, calculation of leverage and multiplier factors, etc. must 
be eliminated.  
Procedures regarding budgeting, delegated management, award funding, monitoring 
processes,  implementation  rules,  risk  exposure,  leverage,  reporting  and  accounting 
must  be  presented  for  all  financial  instruments  in  a  simple,  transparent  manner  in 
formats that can easily be compared.  
The  proposed  debt  and  equity  platforms,  including  the  platform  for  external 
cooperation  and  development,  should  be  chaired  by  one  service  of  the  European 
Commission,  preferably  the  DG  ECFIN,  as  is  the  case  for  the  FIEG.  The  Platform 
should, however, have a steering committee with representatives from the Council and 
the  European  Parliament,  as  well  as  key  stakeholders.  A  technical  group  with 
financiers will also need to be established to develop the implementation rules. 
Regarding the ‘blending’ facilities in external action, an excessive shift to loan based 
mechanisms  that  could  reduce  the  impact  of  poverty  alleviation  and  increase  poor 
countries’ indebtedness must be avoided.  
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ANNEX. INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE 2007–2013 PERIOD 
Funds under centralised or joint management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
in € m 
(2007-2013)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
CIP GIF 
High Growth 
and 
Innovative 
SME Facility 
623  
Actual budget 
2007–2011: 
408  
Equity 
investment 
through 
venture 
capital funds 
1,900  i) Contribute to establishing and financing SMEs 
and reducing the equity and risk-capital market 
gap that prevents SMEs from exploiting their 
growth potential (with a view to improving the 
European venture capital market); and  
ii) support innovative SMEs with high growth 
potential, especially those engaged in research, 
development and other innovations 
EU–27+ 
European 
Economic Area 
+ Turkey, 
Croatia, 
Montenegro, 
FYROM and 
Serbia 
EIF 
CIP SMEG07 
SME 
Guarantee 
Facility 
506  
Actual budget 
2007–2011: 
393 
Loan 
guarantee, 
micro-credit 
guarantee, 
equity and 
mezzanine 
guarantees, 
securitisation 
guarantee 
9,400  (a) Debt financing via loans or leasing to reduce 
difficulties SMEs face in accessing finance; 
stimulating  job creation by increasing available 
debt financing through loan guarantees;  
(b) micro-credit financing to encourage lenders 
to play a greater role in the provision of smaller 
loans by providing micro-credit guarantees and 
optional grants to intermediaries to partially 
offset the high administrative costs of micro-
credit financing; 
(c) guarantees for equity or quasi-equity 
investments in SMEs to provide seed capital 
and/or capital in the start-up phase, as well as 
mezzanine financing through the provision of 
equity guarantees; and 
EU–27+ 
European 
Economic Area 
+ Turkey, 
Croatia, 
Montenegro, 
FYROM and 
Serbia 
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Funds under centralised or joint management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
in € m 
(2007-2013)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
(d) securitisations to support the creation of SME 
debt- finance portfolios by mobilising additional 
debt financing for SMEs 
RSFF 
Risk-Sharing 
Finance 
Facility 
1,000   Risk-sharing  4,800  Improve access to finance for research projects  EU–27 + 
European 
Economic Area 
+ Western 
Balkans 
EIB 
LGTT 
Loan 
Guarantee 
Instrument 
for Trans-
European 
Transport 
Network 
Projects 
500  
(200 of the 
LGTT budget 
to be utilised 
in the pilot 
phase of the 
Project Bond 
Initiative) 
Risk-sharing  12,000  Facilitate increased private sector involvement in 
financing TEN-transport infrastructure to 
mitigate post-construction revenue risk during 
the early operational phase and encourage 
demand-risk-based public-private partnership 
schemes 
EU–27  EIB 
Marguerite 
Fund 
The 2020 
European 
Fund for 
Energy, 
Climate 
Change and 
Infrastructure  
Up to 80  Equity  
EU direct-
equity 
participation 
in the 
Marguerite 
Fund 
Current size 
of fund: 
780 
Target size: 
1,500 
Contribute to infrastructure projects in key 
policy areas (TEN-T, TEN-E, renewables) 
through equity investment in special purpose 
vehicles 
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Funds under centralised or joint management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
in € m 
(2007-2013)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
EPMF 
European 
Progress 
Microfinance 
Facility  
100  Micro-credit 
guarantee 
EU direct- 
equity 
participation 
in Progress 
Micro-finance 
Fund which 
provides 
equity to 
micro-finance 
institutions 
Current size 
of fund: 178 
Target size: 
225 
Increase access and availability of micro-finance 
for disadvantaged groups and people at risk who 
want to establish micro-enterprises, or for 
existing micro-enterprises 
EU–27  EIF and 
EIB 
TTP 
Technology 
Transfer Pilot 
Project 
2  Equity or 
quasi-equity 
investment 
   Facilitate knowledge transfer from universities 
and research bodies to the marketplace, 
especially to SMEs; invest in and support 
technology transfers between universities and 
research institutions and enterprises, especially 
SMEs – such as the creation of ‘spin-offs’ and/or 
the implementation of licensing or collaboration 
agreements 
EU–27  EIF 
JASMINE 
Joint action to 
Support 
Micro-finance 
Institutions in 
Europe 
5  TA / Capacity 
building 
N. A.  Promote a favourable legal and institutional 
and environment for micro micro-credit in 
European regions; support non-bank financial 
intermediaries who want to help the micro-credit 
scene reach high standards in terms of 
governance and lending practices 
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Funds under centralised or joint management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
in € m 
(2007-2013)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
ELENA 
European 
Local ENergy 
Assistance 
97  TA / PDS  1,600  Develop investment programmes that can be 
replicated in other cities and regions; accelerate 
the introduction of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sources, notably through 
innovative financial techniques and practices, 
often at early market penetration 
MS, FYROM 
and EEA 
members 
(Iceland, 
Lichtenstein 
and Norway) 
EIB, KFW, 
CEB and in 
future 
EBRD  
EEEF 
European 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Fund 
146.3 EU 
direct- equity 
participation 
TA / 
awareness- 
raising from 
the TA facility 
Current size 
of fund: 265 
Target size: 
600  
Support energy efficiency and greenhouse-gas 
reduction by promoting energy efficiency and 
small-scale renewable energy investment in a 
municipal context 
EU–27  EIB 
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Funds under shared management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
in € m 
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
JEREMIE 
Joint 
European 
Resources for 
Micro to 
Medium 
Enterprises 
Ca. 700  Equity, loans 
and 
guarantees 
N. A.  Help managing authorities design and 
implement programmes facilitating SME access 
to finance; facilitate the use of financial 
engineering products such as venture capital, 
guarantees, etc. 
EU–27 
regions 
EIF 
JESSICA 
Joint 
European 
Support for 
Sustainable 
Investment in 
City Areas 
Ca. 63  Loans/equit
y provided 
by urban 
development 
funds to PPP 
or other 
structures   
N. A.  Help the authorities in EU member states to 
establish financial engineering mechanisms to 
support investment in sustainable urban 
development and energy efficiency  
EU–27 
regions 
EIB, CEB 
JASPERS 
Joint 
Assistance to 
Support 
Projects in 
European 
Regions 
35 in 2010  TA / PDS  N. A.  Assist the 12 Central- and Eastern-EU member 
states and Croatia in the preparation of major 
projects to be submitted for grant financing 
under the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
EU–12 and 
Croatia 
EIB, EBRD, 
KfW 
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External instruments 
Acronym 
Full  name 
Budget 
in € m 
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
FEMIP 
Facility for 
Euro-
Mediterranean 
Investment and 
Partnership  
128 (risk 
capital)  
+ 105 (TA)  
+ 1 (FEMIP 
Trust Fund) 
Equity, TA, 
contribution
s to FEMIP 
trust fund 
   Economic development and the integration of 
the Mediterranean partner countries with two 
priorities: supporting the private sector and 
creating an investment-friendly environment 
Algeria, 
Egypt, 
Gaza/West 
Bank, Israel, 
Jordan, 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, 
Syria and 
Tunisia 
EIB 
WBIF 
Western 
Balkans 
Investment 
Framework  
87 until now  TA / co-
financing  
   Supporting investments in priority 
infrastructure, private sector (including SMEs) 
and energy efficiency projects to be financed by 
grants from COM, IFIs, MS and other donors and 
loans provided by IFIs 
Candidates 
and potential 
candidate 
countries 
EIB, EBRD, 
CEB, MS 
through their 
public 
financial 
institutions 
NIF 
Neighbourhoo
d Investment 
Facility 
700  TA, interest 
rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
   Covering investment needs of the EU 
neighbouring region for infrastructures in 
transport, energy, environment, social (e.g. 
construction of schools or hospitals), etc. The NIF 
also supports the private sector particularly 
through risk capital operations targeting small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
ENP 
countries, 
Russia, 
Algeria, Libya 
and Syria 
EIB, EBRD, 
CEB, AFD, 
KfW, NIB 
EU-A ITF 
EU-Africa 
Infrastructure 
Trust Fund 
60 + 48.7 
EDF 
resources 
Grants, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
TA 
   Contributing to achieving the EU-Africa 
Partnership strategic objectives by funding 
infrastructure in the region and supporting anti-
poverty efforts, sustainable economic growth, 
Sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
EIB, AfDB THE USE OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR EU POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES | 69 
 
External instruments 
Acronym 
Full  name 
Budget 
in € m 
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
social development, environmental protection 
and regional integration 
AIF 
Asia 
Investment 
Facility 
15 in 2011  
15 in 2012  
– from the 
EU budget 
TA, interest 
rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
  Promoting additional investments in key 
infrastructure with a focus on climate-change 
relevant and ‘green’ investments in environment, 
energy, as well as SME’s and social 
infrastructure 
Asian 
countries 
EIB, EBRD, 
NIB, ADB, 
AfD, KfW, 
OeEB, 
SIMEST, 
SOFID 
CIF 
Caribbean 
Investment 
facility 
40  in 10th 
EDF 
2012 
TA, interest 
rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
  Contribute to strengthening regional integration 
and access to basic social services through 
improving physical infrastructure and related 
services, thereby supporting several EU 
crosscutting themes and Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) 
ACP 
Caribbean 
Countries 
EIB, NIB, 
CDB, IDB, 
others 
joining 
IFP 
Investment 
Facility for the 
Pacific 
40 10th EDF 
2012 
TA, interest 
rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
  Contribute to strengthening regional integration 
and access to basic social services through 
improving physical infrastructure and related 
services, thereby supporting several EU 
crosscutting themes, in particular climate change 
and MDGs 
ACP Pacific 
countrries 
EIB, AFD, 
KfW, 
AusAID, 
ADB,NZAID
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External instruments 
Acronym 
Full  name 
Budget 
in € m 
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
ACP 
Investment 
Facility 
  
3.2 
(revolving 
fund from 
EDF 
resources) 
Loans, 
equity, 
guarantees; 
blending 
with EIB 
own-
resources 
loans, 
interest rate 
subsidies 
and TA 
possible 
   Contribute to economic development, 
particularly of the private sector, in the ACP 
countries  
African, 
Caribbean 
and Pacific 
States (ACP), 
Overseas 
Countries and 
Territories 
(OCT) 
IFI, EIB 
GEEREF 
Global Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Energy Fund 
80  EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing 
TA and 
equity  
Current size of 
fund: 108 
Target size: 200 
Expand renewable energy, energy efficiency and 
other clean-energy-technologies markets and 
services in developing countries and economies 
in transition; maximise leverage of public funds 
through investments in regional sub-funds with 
the objective of promoting public and/or private 
sustainable energy partnerships and encourage 
technology transfer and deployment 
African, 
Caribbean 
and Pacific 
States, North 
Africa, 
Eastern 
Europe, Latin 
American and 
Asian 
countries 
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External instruments 
Acronym 
Full  name 
Budget 
in € m 
Type of EU 
support 
Total 
investment at 
beneficiary 
level in € m 
Objectives  Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
Entity 
EFSE 
European Fund 
for Southeast 
Europe 
Ca. 70  EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing 
loans, equity 
and 
guarantees 
Size of fund: 
732  
Overall: Provide development finance in 
Southeast Europe, focusing on the needs of 
micro-enterprises and SMEs; contribute to 
strengthening the financial sector; deliver SME, 
rural and housing development products. 
Specifically: increase access to finance for micro-
enterprises and attract private investors to the 
Western Balkans  
Western 
Balkans, 
Moldova, 
Romania and 
Bulgaria 
EIF 
GGF 
Green for 
Growth Fund 
38.6 in Fund 
5 for TA 
EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing  
direct 
lending and 
on-lending 
through 
local 
financial 
institutions,  
additional 
TA Facility 
Current size of 
fund: 128 
Target size: 400  
Broaden the financing base of EE and RE 
investments in the target region; increase 
awareness of energy efficiency and small 
renewable energy products among companies 
and private households; help broaden and 
deepen financial sector servicing the 
development needs; harmonize and coordinate 
donor initiatives 
Western 
Balkans and 
Turkey 
EIF 
 
Source: Information compiled from the EP, EIB and EC. 